

1 [The AR 15-6 Investigation opened at 0820, 20 November
2 2004, Ft. Benning, GA.]

3 PERSONS PRESENT

4 [REDACTED] - Investigating Officer;
5 [REDACTED] and
6 [REDACTED] - Court Reporter.

7 IO: My name is [REDACTED] I'm the AR 15-6
8 Investigating Officer, investigating the facts and
9 circumstances surrounding the death of Corporal Tillman in
10 Afghanistan on 22 April 2004.

11 [REDACTED] U.S. Army, was called as a witness,
12 was sworn and testified as follows:

13 Questions by the investigating officer:

14 Q. Please state your full name, your rank and spell your
15 last name for the record.

16 A. Yes. My name is [REDACTED] I'm a [REDACTED]
17 in the rank of [REDACTED]

18 Q. If ever we get to a point where we're violating
19 confidentiality please feel free to let us know.

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. What I would like to know is when did you first become
22 aware of the death of Corporal Tillman?

23 A. As soon as it was transmitted over the radio in the
4 regimental TOC, probably within 90 minutes of the event.

1 Q. And where was the regimental TOC located?

2 A. I was in Bagram, sir.

3 Q. So, you were in Bagram?

4 A. No, sir. I was in Shkinh at the time.

5 Q. You were at Shkinh?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Okay. And after that notification what did you do?

8 A. I got word from the regimental TOC to get on the--there

9 was a rotary ring re-supply and it was being pushed out.

10 They were bringing another tiers [REDACTED] on that,

11 sending him along, in anticipation obviously of some things

12 here. And so when that aircraft came to Shkinh I got on

13 that aircraft and flew out with [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] Are we clear to----

15 Q. She has a secret clearance, but we really want to keep

16 it unclassified as possible.

17 A. So, the short of it is we had another [REDACTED] from

18 another battalion got on the aircraft with the sight from

19 another element, the task force, and then we flew out to

20 FOB Selerno.

21 Q. And when you arrived at FOB Selerno do you remember

22 what day and what time that was?

23 A. Yes, sir. It was the day after and it would have been

24 approximately 14Z.

1 Q. 14Z on the 23rd?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. And when you arrived to Selerno what did you do at
4 that time?

5 A. At that time what was happening is the remains were
6 being transported. So essentially that transpired as we
7 landed, and then there was a send off ceremony for his
8 remains, and they transloaded his remains on that
9 helicopter, along with the [REDACTED] and his [REDACTED]
10 and I believe one other individual. And who that
11 individual was from the task force it escapes me, I don't
12 remember—I don't recall who that was. And then that
13 aircraft took off and I remained at Selerno.

14 Q. Okay. Did you have any exchanges there at Selerno?

15 A. Yes, sir. After that event----

16 Q. When the body arrived?

17 A. No, [REDACTED]—I had very limited time—there was
18 some—I think at that point people already knew that it was
19 a fratricide. So when I say "people" leadership, okay. I
20 don't recall to what degree at that point it was common
21 knowledge, and there was a situation where this
22 [REDACTED] that came with me is not a member of our task
23 force, so there was a little apprehension to have an

1 external person involved here at that point. So there was
2 a little bit of friction there at that point.

3 Q. Where did that friction come from?

4 A. The friction was more probably at the NCO level.

5 Q. Any NCO expressed that to you?

6 A. A few of them did, yes, sir, and that's not uncommon.

7 Q. And what exactly did they say to you that indicated
8 that there was friction?

9 A. It was more of an issue of—they understand the process
10 so what happens when there is a critical incident there is
11 a process that we go through, and they immediately
12 understood for him to be involved in the process of the
13 Critical Event Debriefs so on and so forth. And I think it
14 wouldn't have mattered if it was a fratricide or any—or
15 whatever the nature of the event there is not necessarily a
16 reticent willingness sometimes to accept an outsider, and
17 especially when they don't know the person. So, there was
18 some of that and I explained what he was there for, and I
19 think that basically subsided that whole—that issue kind of
20 died very quickly.

21 Q. What exactly did they tell you were reticent?

22 A. Essentially they were bringing the [REDACTED] in. They
23 wanted—they had their [REDACTED] was
24 being brought in from another location. He was not at that

1 place in point and time, so he was being brought in. They
2 were in kind of a state of—at that point, you know, a
3 couple of things; one, we're getting off the aircraft;
4 they're about ready to transload his remains off of there.
5 So, they were expecting me to come. They had asked for me
6 to come. They had not asked for the ██████ to come. We
7 have our own ██████ by the way, and that's another piece of
8 this. So, "we have our own psych, why isn't he here, we
9 don't know this guy." And there was a little bit of
10 concern about the ██████ willingness to talk to or open
11 up or conduct a coherent debrief with an outsider present,
12 which I think under the nature of any of those task force
13 elements would probably feel the same way. So, I don't
14 think it was—I don't want to paint something as being
15 unique to the circumstances, no.

16 Q. Okay. You'd said earlier that leadership was under
17 the impression that this was a fratricide.

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Who told you that?

20 A. ██████ he was the CFT-acting ██████ at
21 that point.

22 Q. And what exactly did ██████ tell you?

23 A. Essentially, at this point they were moving to take
24 steps to, you know, put together an investigation, to look

1 into it, 15-6. And he said probability right now from what
2 we're-the word we're getting and what's occurred and what's
3 taken place is that this is a probable fratricide. And he
4 said I want you to be aware of that when you do the
5 Critical Event Debriefs that there is some background here
6 to this. And so basically the minute I hit the ground-
7 well, let me back up. I already knew that before I got
8 there. So that was a piece of information that was
9 validated when I hit the ground.

10 Q. So you were at Shkinh----

11 A. When I was contacted at Shkinh I was told-I was
12 informed at that point-this is again a day later, but I was
13 informed at that point that this was a probable fratricide
14 by the [REDACTED]

15 Q. Who was that?

16 A. [REDACTED]

17 Q. Okay. So [REDACTED] told you on the 23rd-morning,
18 afternoon?

19 A. It would have been prior to being picked up on the
20 rotary ring. I don't exactly remember. I know that I
21 arrived at Selerno at about 14Z, and it was about an hour
22 flight so it would have been sometime in the morning or
23 until noon Z, somewhere in that window. I don't recall the
24 exact time that I got that----

1 Q. The morning of the 23rd or afternoon?
2 A. I would say midday on that.
3 Q. If it was 14Z that's 4 and half hours plus.
4 A. Roger, sir.
5 Q. So, that's not really morning, that's later in the
6 afternoon.
7 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. I was thinking local time.
10 Q. 1400 local, not Z?
11 A. I mean, I was thinking for your sake local time.
12 Q. Was it 1400 local or 1400Z?
13 A. No, I arrived at Selerno at 14Z.
14 Q. 14Z?
15 A. Right.
16 Q. So, that was probably around 1830 local?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. So, it was dark then?
19 A. Not quite. When--asa matter of fact, I think there
20 was about--I may be off on my time. There was about an hour
21 of light after departure. So, 1400 sticks out in my mind,
22 and I went back and I tried to look at my email traffic,
23 but there was about--I would say it was mid to late
24 afternoon when this occurred, local time.

1 Q. Now, you had been told by [REDACTED] at Shkinh on the
2 23rd?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And what time was that?

5 A. That would have been about midday.

6 Q. And then you proceeded to Selerno?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Aircraft came in; you had your exchange with the
9 soldiers there.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. And then what happened?

12 A. Then essentially at that point we waited for the
13 [REDACTED] to come back in in total. They were fragmented
14 because they had a vehicle that they were—that was down and
15 they were bringing that back in. And then we were also
16 waiting on the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] to come in. I
17 don't recall in that—I want to say it was that evening, the
18 evening of that day they flew in from their location. I
19 don't recall exactly when they got there.

20 Q. Would that have been the 24th?

21 A. Yes, sir, it would have been the 24th. And then at
22 that point what we attempted to do was setup a time to do
23 Critical Event Debriefs, and then also at that time they
24 were already initiating the 15-6. So, there is a little

1 bit of dynamic tension there because you need to do the
2 Critical Event Debrief or you should do the Critical Event
3 Debrief within a certain period of time, but at the same
4 time you've got an investigation going on, so it convolutes
5 the process.

6 Q. And how did it convolute the process in this case?

7 A. Well, you've got people that are making sworn
8 statements. So, if you look at it—if you separate the two
9 events, you've got a Critical Event Debrief. What's its
10 purpose? Its purpose is it's an AAR. It's essentially a
11 controlled AAR that basically takes it to the following
12 levels, you know, what did you see, what did you do, and
13 how did you respond.

14 Q. Now, this Critical Event Debrief, who ran the Critical
15 Event Debrief?

16 A. Typically you have two people. Typically either the
17 [REDACTED] will either be the moderator or he may be just the
18 observer; but typically you have two people. It can be a
19 [REDACTED] and a [REDACTED]. It can be the [REDACTED] and the
20 person he would designate, but typically that's the person
21 who's involved in the process. So, when [REDACTED]
22 got on the ground we—the chain of command, we sat down and
23 decided who should do the debrief. And so what they chose
24 to do is they made the—because the [REDACTED] was not from our

1 task force they put him in a position of being there for
2 individuals who'd like to talk to him. So, we kind of set
3 the conditions where the debrief is going to be run;
4 [REDACTED] is going to be the moderator and I'm
5 going to be the observer. So, the moderator's purpose is
6 to guide the discussion. The observer's purpose is to sit
7 and watch people's responses and essentially make
8 observations as to you know the mental state and frame of
9 the individuals in the debrief. And like I said we had the
10 [REDACTED] there and available in the event that somebody wanted
11 to talk to somebody. And there were, in fact, two or three
12 individuals in that platoon that did end up talking to the
13 [REDACTED]. And it gets convoluted because now in a perfect
14 world that process is going on before people really have
15 any opportunity to think about or really put together their
16 story, so to speak. This is—we try to get so it's all
17 fresh for people and in this situation now you've got
18 people already being asked questions by an investigating
19 officer. And then there was a little bit of trying to
20 figure out okay, what do we do first here, what is
21 priority; do we allow the investigation to go on to
22 completion; do we mingle it with the Critical Event Debrief
23 process or do we halt the investigation until we do the
24 Critical Event Debrief.

1 Q. And what happened?

2 A. What ended up happening is they continued to drive on
3 with the investigation.

4 Q. At the same time of the Critical Event Debrief?

5 A. Yeah, and what we did is it reached a certain point in
6 the process where they had made a decision that they were
7 going to bring somebody external to the organization to
8 continue the 15-6 Investigation. When that occurred then
9 we actually did the Critical Event Debrief, which I believe
10 would have been from the time I got on the ground to
11 approximately somewhere 48 to 72 hours later.

12 Q. Okay. And the AAR was done when?

13 A. Excuse me, sir.

14 Q. You said the AAR was done when?

15 A. The internal AAR?

16 Q. Um hmm.

17 A. Their internal AAR was done the day prior to the
18 Critical Event Debrief.

19 Q. The day prior to the Critical Event Debrief?

20 A. Yes, sir. What they did is they basically—they had—it
21 was an AAR on essentially bumper to bumper and including,
22 you know, vehicle recovery.

23 Q. And on what day was that? Everybody came in on the
24 24th.

1 A. Yes, sir. I'm trying to remember. I think there was
2 a leader's AAR that was not a comprehensive AAR, in other
3 words everybody. It was a leader's AAR and it was focused
4 primarily on I believe—I want to say [REDACTED] and
5 above.

6 Q. And what day was that?

7 A. That was the day prior. So, it was a TOC AAR. So, if
8 you can kind of separate the two this is really not the
9 [REDACTED] AAR.

10 Q. I understand. And that was done on the 24th-25th?

11 A. Yeah, that would have been done—yes, sir, right in
12 that window, probably the evening of—in between the window
13 of those two days, that night because we do reverse cycle.
14 So, it was internal to the TOC reference actions taken. It
15 was more TOC focused and directed.

16 Q. Who ran that?

17 A. I think at that point the [REDACTED]. So,
18 the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] probably ran the
19 meeting, and if I remember correctly, and then the [REDACTED]
20 was present. And at that point the [REDACTED] was not brought
21 into the process. And then we did the Critical Event
22 Debrief actually with the platoon and then they had their
23 AARs following that.

1 Q. Okay. Let's go back to the Critical Events Debrief.

2 Now, from what you've said this was after the AAR, the
3 leadership AAR?

4 A. Yeah, and that occurred in the TOC and to be honest
5 with you, sir, at the time normally I try to attend those
6 meetings, you know, if at all possible, recognizing also
7 that I'm external to the organization, but that's never
8 been an issue. External meaning that's at the battalion
9 level and I'm at the regimental level. However, at that
10 time I was engaged with—when that was occurring I was
11 engaged with the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED], and we were trying
12 to put the pieces together and come up with our own plan of
13 how we were going to approach things, and we were in the
14 process. So, I did not physically attend that. So I don't
15 know to what degree or length they went into discussion in
16 terms of, you know, what occurred. I think it was actions
17 taken in the TOC during the event and that was the focus,
18 and obviously that was a part of it because there were also
19 ongoing operations.

20 Q. Well, let's move to the Critical Events Debrief.

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Now, you were in the Critical Events Debrief as an
23 observer?

24 A. That's correct; yes, sir.

1 Q. Can you convey anything that occurred in the Critical
2 Event Debrief?

3 A. Yes, sir. Basically from the most junior individual
4 to the most senior individual in the room, everybody who
5 was on sight basically—they kind of went through it from
6 start to finish, obviously minus the [REDACTED] and one other
7 individual because they were taken to Bagram to be treated
8 medically. So, essentially what transpired is okay, we
9 went through the standard AAR process from essentially
10 receipt of mission to mission complete, and what things
11 occurred, talked about friction points so on and so forth,
12 communication----

13 Q. Any note of a friction point that we need to know
14 about?

15 A. No. I think that the people on the ground did not
16 want to split the force. They were directed to split the
17 force, that was a friction point.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. People on the ground were not comfortable with moving—
20 we're directed to move now; we're not real comfortable with
21 moving during the hours of daylight, especially when you've
22 been templated, people know you're there, the hours of
23 daylight, and that typically in our experience most of our
24 movement is at night. So, now you've got a down vehicle.

1 So there are some other variables or some other factors
2 here. So, you've got some maintenance issues. You've got-
3 there was some discussion about, you know, sling load
4 operations, those kinds of things. All of those kinds of
5 things surfaced. So, I think the friction points were
6 essentially moving in the hours of daylight and splitting
7 the force.

8 Q. [REDACTED]

9 A. [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 Q. [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 A. [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 Q. In the course of this AAR did anyone express concern
18 they had received information and how that was forewarning
19 of an attack?

20 A. No.

21 Q. No soldiers specifically noted that he had provided
22 another noncommissioned officer from a local, which said
23 that they believed that they were going to be attacked?

1 So there are some other variables or some other factors
2 here. So, you've got some maintenance issues. You've got-
3 there was some discussion about, you know, sling load
4 operations, those kinds of things. All of those kinds of
5 things surfaced. So, I think the friction points were
6 essentially moving in the hours of daylight and splitting
7 the force.

8 Q. Was there any prohibition against moving in daylight?

9 A. METT-T is always going to drive the-drive that, but I
10 believe that there was a general understanding that if at
11 all possible to limit movement in hours of daylight in
12 terms of----

13 Q. Was there any official direction that said that they
14 were only to move in day or night?

15 A. Not to the-that never surfaced; no one in position of
16 leadership understood that to be the case.

17 Q. In the course of this AAR did anyone express concern
18 they had received information and how that was forewarning
19 of an attack?

20 A. No.

21 Q. No soldiers specifically noted that he had provided
22 another noncommissioned officer from a local, which said
23 that they believed that they were going to be attacked?

1 A. No. I think I know what you're talking--essentially
2 there was concern over a local who said that there had been
3 activity in that area and that there was possibility that
4 they might be observed--might have been observed.

5 Q. When you say, "Might have been observed" were those
6 the words used?

7 A. That was what was used in the Event Debrief.

8 Q. Okay. All right. During the sensing session did
9 anyone ever say to all of the soldiers they should share
10 blame for the incident or words to that effect?

11 A. No, sir.

12 Q. Did you ever hear anyone say that no one should talk
13 about the incident?

14 A. No, sir.

15 Q. Okay. Did you ever hear anyone say that this incident
16 would damage the regiment's reputation and it shouldn't be
17 talked about?

18 A. No, sir.

19 IO: Do you have anything else?

20 [REDACTED] No, sir.

21 Q. [REDACTED] is there anything that you would like to add
22 to this that we haven't discussed here?

23 A. Yes, sir. I think--how to frame this, this is, you
24 know, I don't--from my vantage point getting right to the

1 crux of this I don't see any attempt on the part of the
2 chain of command to conceal anything. I mean, if that was--
3 I've been around--I didn't get off the potato truck
4 yesterday, you know, and I've been around organizations
5 long enough to know if there was an attempt to cover up
6 something I'd been the last guy to find out. Okay.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I mean, think about it, the [REDACTED]. So, anyway I
9 don't see any attempt to conceal. Secondly, during the
10 course of the Critical Event Debrief there was openness,
11 and candor, and admission on the part of the individuals.
12 For example the gunner, he said, "I almost knew right away;
13 I just had a sick feeling in my gut that something wasn't
14 right."

15 Q. And which guy was that?

16 A. It was [REDACTED] [phonetic].

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. So, I think they immediately knew. I think there was
19 a sense on the ground right away that this was a friendly
20 fire incident. Also Tillman's actions, if you look at
21 Tillman's actions----

22 Q. Which Tillman are you referring to?

23 A. I'm talking Corporal Tillman.

24 Q. Okay.

1 A. If you look at how they're trained, and if you look at
2 their TTPs and what his role, what his function was on-in
3 that, he exceeded the parameters of how they're trained, in
4 other words in aggression. We train guys to be aggressive
5 and think for themselves, but to be in pursuit of the enemy
6 so to speak, but not be under control, I think that's a
7 critical element here.

8 Q. Would you elaborate on that please?

9 A. I think it was—and this was not a shifting of blame
10 because this didn't come out—people talked about their own
11 actions. You know this is not subjective; this is
12 objective; "this is what I did," okay. So, this was more—
13 and I'm trying to be—you know, I'm getting older too, so
14 you know what happens to your memory, so it gets a little
15 convoluted, but I don't recall where I got this information
16 from, if it was actually as the critical event was winding
17 down or I had residual conversations, and I spent the next
18 10 days with these guys in combat operations. I went out
19 with them for 10 days. And so over the course of time more
20 and more becomes unearthed, so I'm trying to be—I'm trying
21 to make sure that my memory is serving me correctly. But I
22 think they all felt that Tillman was always overly
23 aggressive and a lot of them felt like his actions that day

1 had put himself and [REDACTED] [phonetic] and the Afghan
2 soldier in peril that was unnecessary.

3 Q. Was that common?

4 A. In him?

5 Q. In the feelings of the soldiers that you talked to?

6 A. Yes, sir. This was not just one person. And they
7 were reluctant because, you know, the guy's their buddy;
8 he's been killed; they've killed him; and so you know I
9 don't think anybody was shifting blame or diverting
10 responsibility from self, but I think it was an honest
11 appraisal of a situation. If you look at where he was on
12 the terrain, how he got there, where everybody else was on
13 the terrain it's fairly obvious that who's controlling-
14 who's the-where's the C2 of this guy, and was he directed
15 to go there; no. So there's some culpability here,
16 individual culpability, actions under duress or in combat
17 that I think are another piece of the filter to look at.
18 You know, now that's not excusing the actions of the
19 gunner, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], you know, and not PIDing
20 the target properly, and that's a fact. I mean, if proper
21 identification, you know, of the target, and I'm sure
22 you've gone down that road too in the process of the
23 investigation, but that's a question that would need to be
24 asked, and I believe that as they looked at that, as the

1 investigation looked at that and as people were dealt with
2 punitively I think that was a major factor in, for example,
3 [REDACTED] punishment.

4 Q. You said major factor in [REDACTED] punishment.

5 A. Or a factor.

6 Q. When you say "a factor" in [REDACTED] punishment what do
7 you mean by that?

8 A. I mean he was responsible to make sure they identified
9 their target.

10 Q. Okay. All right. Anything else, [REDACTED]

11 A. No, sir. I think at the senior level, at the
12 commander level, the [REDACTED] was also on
13 the ground, that's another piece of this. And the

14 [REDACTED] and I spent time talking to him so I
15 got his appraisal of what he thought in terms of how things
16 unfolded. And I think that this is a personal opinion—is
17 the tape still on?

18 Q. Yes, it is.

19 A. Okay. In my personal opinion looking at this thing
20 from my vantage point in talking to people and recognizing
21 who this person is—this is what [REDACTED] are supposed to
22 do, candor—okay, looking at who this person is and I'm just
23 going to be totally honest. If this was my son and I have
24 three of them, and two of them are in uniform, one will

1 soon be. If this was my son I don't know if I would be
2 sitting here today. Okay, so I am well aware of who this
3 individual is and what it's generated, the looking into. I
4 think that the chain of command was aware of that, and I
5 think under the circumstances recognizing who the
6 individual was and the fallout that can be perceived as a
7 result of this, and then being a friendly fire incident I
8 would say that their actions were honorable from start to
9 finish. There was no attempt in anybody's part from the
10 [REDACTED] on down or anybody in that task force
11 to conceal what had transpired, and afforded the soldiers,
12 the rangers, every opportunity to talk about, express, deal
13 with their grief, their loss, their actions. And I saw no
14 attempt on anybody's part to conceal anything, and I
15 realize that we have a family here that's in grief. I
16 realize that we have a family that wants answers, and then
17 there's the military side of this thing, you know, to bring
18 closure to it. I understand all of those things and the
19 pressure brought to bear, but I firmly believe that I did
20 not see anything and I would be the first to tell you if
21 there was something that I observed as a [REDACTED] that
22 caused me to question the integrity of the organization in
23 dealing with the loss of a ranger, in this particular case

1 the ranger happens to be an infamous personality of sorts.

2 All right, sir.

3 Q. Anything else?

4 A. That's it.

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would you be willing to share your
6 email traffic with us?

7 WIT: Yeah, as long as it's not—I mean, as long as the chain
8 of command would authorize it. I don't know if I have—most
9 of my email traffic is, you know, pertaining to going to do
10 the debrief, actions for the honor ceremony at—which would
11 have been at Bagram. So I was communicating with that
12 chaplain who came and received the remains. So, it would
13 have been email traffic that would have pertained to making
14 sure that they did the right things in terms of the honor
15 ceremony. So, I don't know that there—that any of my email
16 traffic would----

17 Q. The only thing the email traffic does for us is it
18 shows—it establishes timelines of when events occurred
19 because that's one of the things that we're doing, trying
20 to make sure we have a good solid timeline from beginning
21 to end, and the timing of those emails kind of helps us
22 make sure that we've got the days right.

23 A. And again as far as the date/time group this is, you
24 know, this is best recollection here.

1 Q. I understand.

2 A. And I may go back to my email and go "oh, shoot, you
3 were 24 hours"—I mean "you were hours off," but the—if
4 there is anything that I've told you here today—and I
5 didn't research this. I was TDY, so^u this is off the cuff
6 here. So, I didn't run into my office and kind of get my
7 facts straight. So, this is my best recollection.

8 Q. We understand.

9 A. So, if I go back and I check my email and I see that
10 I'm off a little bit I will let you know. I will square
11 that away, but I'm pretty certain that my recollection of
12 the event, when I was notified and then being taken from
13 Shkinh, and I do remember, and I told you Z times, and I
14 think that that needs to probably be corrected. I do think
15 that that was local time.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. So, it would have been about 14 local because what
18 triggered it is is when you asked in hours of darkness and
19 you asked was it 4 and half hours difference. And the
20 reason that I'm having problems there is because they
21 operated off of Z at Bagram, but they did not operate at
22 the FOBs and the other cites, some of the BPs they operated
23 off of local time. So, it may be a little bit of mush
24 there, but I do know that when I landed—when the aircraft

1 took off there was a few—there was at least a couple of
2 hours of light yet.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And you're right in terms of hours of darkness it
5 would have been 1900–1900 there about.

6 Q. All right. Listen; before you leave let me remind you
7 that this is still an open investigation. We ask that you
8 not discuss this with anyone, but we do appreciate your
9 time and your candor.

10 A. Okay. No problem, sir.

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] your email traffic, if you want to
12 get that to [REDACTED]

13 WIT: Can do, sir. Yeah, I'll go through—I've got four
14 different accounts, but I'll go through them.

15 IO: Can we turn it off please?

16 [The witness withdrew from the room.]