

1 INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] TAKEN ON 16 NOVEMBER 2004

2 [Transcribed by [REDACTED], previously sworn and certified  
3 court reporter.]

4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED], I'm [REDACTED].  
5 I'm the AR 15-6 investigating officer, looking into the facts  
6 and circumstances surrounding the death of Corporal Tillman.

7 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir.

8 [REDACTED] If you would, at this time?

9 [REDACTED] was sworn.]

10 [REDACTED] Please state your full name, your rank, and  
11 spell your last for the record.

12 [REDACTED]: My name's [REDACTED]. It's [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]: Okay. [REDACTED], what I'd like you to do is  
14 based upon the incident that occurred to where Corporal Tillman  
15 was killed in Afghanistan, would you, please, give me your  
16 version of what occurred prior to the incident occurring up to  
17 when the incident occurred?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. We deployed to -- I won't go too far  
19 back. [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]

2 EXCO of that [REDACTED] when Corporal Tillman was killed.

3 [REDACTED] Okay. Can you tell me, to the best of your  
4 recollection, what occurred leading up to his death?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. Throughout the -- you're probably  
6 intimately familiar with Afghanistan, sir. Throughout the  
7 operation, there were vehicle problems. Just the sheer nature  
8 of that terrain; you're going to bang up GMVs. They're going to  
9 break. They're going to fall apart. So GMV part re-supply  
almost nightly was one of our main efforts; was to sling parts  
11 out -- not to sling parts but deliver parts via helicopter to  
12 each of the locations that we could or consolidated company  
13 locations where it was a little more remote. And that's really  
14 the crux of the dilemma that was -- with this [REDACTED]

15 This [REDACTED] was at [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] and that's where they  
19 were staying for a lot longer than we expected. It was probably  
20 in the span of days that this vehicle was broken, and we  
couldn't -- we had given them every part that they had asked for

1 to repair that thing, and it just -- it was a hangar queen. I  
2 guess -- I'd never seen the vehicle until it came back. But  
3 every time we delivered it, it was constant dialogue between the  
4 LOG guys and the [REDACTED] "Hey, is this all the parts you need?"  
5 "Roger that." Well it turned out that they assessed that they  
6 could tow it. They asked for a sling to sling the vehicle out.  
7 We called CJTF-180, and they said it would be 96 hours before we  
8 could get the sling. So they started towing it with a GMV north  
9 from -- and there was only one route in, one route out.

They started towing it north. It became more  
11 problematic to tow it with a GMV, because the GMV that was  
12 towing this vehicle then become -- you know, it was starting to  
13 wear down those vehicles to a point where it would have broken  
14 more.

15 So my understanding is they went in one of the local  
16 villages and contracted a jinga truck, which in and of itself is  
17 not alarming. Jinga trucks traffic all of our goods for the  
18 most part that's non -- stuff that we don't have to secure --  
19 the food supply from Bagram all over the country. So jinga  
20 resourcing is not, in and of itself, surprising. They hooked

1 this thing up to the jinga truck, began dragging with the jinga  
2 truck.

3 And when it went through the one route is where they  
4 got hit. The reason they were coming north is I was at Khowst  
5 and had coordinated with the [REDACTED] to get a wrecker,  
6 because I didn't want them to tow it with this jinga truck the  
7 whole way back. One, it's just embarrassing and, two, I wanted  
8 to get a wrecker team on the ground because, in one cycle of  
9 darkness, we would have been able to bring it to the link up  
point where they needed to transfer this to the wrecker.

11 Obviously, that's pretty important just to minimize the convoy  
12 traffic that's unnecessary.

13 So we were going to do a night link up, transfer the  
14 HMMWV, and then let the [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] The wrecker was en route when the  
16 ambush was reported. Once the ambush was reported, I recalled  
17 the wrecker and then developed that situation from Khowst.

18 And the rest is -- I don't know how far you want me to  
19 go, sir.

20 [REDACTED] Okay. Let's back up to the issue of how long  
was the [REDACTED] in any one location with a broken down vehicle?

1 [REDACTED] I think it's measured in days, sir. I can't  
2 remember exactly. I know they were at [REDACTED] I  
3 think was what I can recall. And he did a swap of [REDACTED], if  
4 I can remember. One [REDACTED] conducted an [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED] And then, at some point, we had -- that [REDACTED]  
6 then was lifted out, and he did kind of a -- [REDACTED]  
7 did a swap [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] that [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] I can't remember if  
9 that was the exact [REDACTED] or not, but there was -- we were  
10 there, [REDACTED] I think was how  
11 long we were there.

12 So, at any given point, [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED] It was pretty well  
14 fortified. So there may have been forces there. [REDACTED] may have  
15 been there for most of the time he was down [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]?

17 [REDACTED]: He's [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

18 [REDACTED] Okay. In the course of this decision to move  
19 the vehicle to be recovered by a wrecker, who made the decision  
20 that the [REDACTED] should split?

1 [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] sir. And this is where --  
2 this is consistently -- I've been interviewed on this a couple  
3 of times. We developed a plan for -- this is the plan as we  
4 developed it. And, actually, the irony of this whole thing is I  
5 felt very comfortable with the plan because with me when we  
6 planned it was the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]. I mean, they were back  
7 there with me. [REDACTED] called them back to begin our

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] And where were you at?

[REDACTED] I was at Khowst, sir.

11 [REDACTED] So you were at Khowst?

12 [REDACTED] Right.

13 [REDACTED] And where was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]?

14 [REDACTED]: He was at Khowst with me. They were all at  
15 Khowst with me.

16 [REDACTED]: All at Khowst?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. It's the FOB -- [REDACTED] which  
18 really was our [REDACTED] Headquarters.

19 We were -- it quickly became evident that the main  
20 effort for this platoon was recovering that HMMWV. So [REDACTED] had  
already come back out. We EXFILL'd him on helos that night or

1 the night before to do the planning. And [REDACTED] wanted  
2 to give his commander's guidance and work that whole piece out  
3 because, at that time, we were like, [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 However, it was obvious from the reports that we had  
6 to do something to help get this vehicle out. The nature of the  
7 roads -- I don't know if it's easier if I just draw.

8 [Pause.]

9 [REDACTED] It doesn't go north enough, but the nature of  
the roads were -- this was the ambush location. The EXFILL  
11 route required them to go through this site north.

12 [REDACTED] Khowst Highway?

13 [REDACTED] It was not to the Khowst Highway. The Khowst  
14 Highway was right here. This part of the road, south of the  
15 Khowst highway was not navigable by a wrecker. And that was  
16 simply -- I mean, [REDACTED] had done the route, [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED] -- [REDACTED], folks were already back at [REDACTED] that  
18 had done this INFILL. So that was the -- you know, "Okay. How  
19 far can I get a wrecker?" They said, "You can get it to the end  
20 of the Khowst Highway before it buttons to [inaudible]."

1           So the plan was, at this point, [REDACTED] wanted  
2 them to [REDACTED]. There was a portion of the [REDACTED]  
3 near Manah, that they had [REDACTED]. Because we'd done  
4 everything -- [REDACTED] -- we'd [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]. There was one portion that  
6 they were required to [REDACTED]. And, [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED] we wanted to bring that [REDACTED] up here; bring the  
8 wrecker to as far as it could; do a vehicle swap -- because they  
9 did this drive in 3 hours. It wasn't an all night, all day long  
10 thing. Do the swap; [REDACTED] and then finish their  
11 deal. And that was just a -- "Hey, let's just check one last --  
12 turn one last stone and then get out of [REDACTED]" And the [REDACTED] was  
13 like, "There's nothing there." And we'd INFILL'd this way. So,  
14 on INFILL, we asked company commanders what their assessments  
15 were. It was, "Hey, this is not active support. It's passive  
16 at best, but we're not seeing any of the indicators that we  
17 thought."

18           And I probably went off track but, in any case, that  
19 was the plan; to get the vehicle and come back. [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were with me in the TOC when we developed  
this plan. And we had run folks down to the [REDACTED] to get a



1 wrecker, and it was being escorted by one of our [REDACTED] from  
2 Khowst. So I felt comfortable because we had all kind of come  
3 up with the plan at the same time. It wasn't a -- I was  
4 soliciting feedback from them, and I was under the understanding  
5 that it was pretty clear to everybody, what was supposed to  
6 happen.

7 [REDACTED] Okay. What did you tell [REDACTED] they were  
8 supposed to do?

9 [REDACTED]: I told him they were supposed to conduct the  
linkup, drop off the HMMWV, [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED] Did you ever tell [REDACTED] to have the element  
13 split?

14 [REDACTED] No. I did not.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. The methodology of operation in  
16 Afghanistan: Do your people operate in the day, or are they  
17 required to operate at night?

18 [REDACTED] They do both, sir. To interact with the  
19 people, it has to be in the day.

20 [REDACTED]: Are their movements planned for day or night?

1 [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] So, basically, their tactical movements to get  
8 into position to conduct those operations [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] Okay. Was that clearly understood throughout  
12 the battalion?

13 [REDACTED] I thought it was, but that may not be the case.  
14 I thought it was.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. Was that the -- whose direction was that?

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] Okay. So the [REDACTED] direction was  
18 when you moved, you know, tactically from one location to  
19 another prior to the [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

[REDACTED] ---- you moved at night?

1 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. And that was because of [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED] who was killed in November -- November 13th for the  
3 same reason. [REDACTED] and that was when he  
4 issued that edict. [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] Okay.<sup>5</sup> When this incident occurred, when was it  
7 known to you -- or, when did you think it was clear to you that  
8 this had been a friendly-fire incident?

9 [REDACTED] It didn't become clear to me until [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] called. I talked to him on a red line, and he said, "I  
11 think this was fratricide." I spoke with [REDACTED] the  
12 night he came back, because I have a twin brother who's an [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]. So, when he came in -- when Pat Tillman came into  
14 the CFT, the first question I asked was, "Where's his brother?"  
15 He had still -- he had not EX'd over. He was still at the site.

16 We sent the helicopters back, and EXFILL'd Tillman.  
17 And, literally, I was the first person he talked to after laying  
18 the flag on his brother. And I -- as a brother to brother, I  
19 said, "Hey, I can't imagine what you're going through," blah,  
20 blah, blah. We engaged in a discussion just to -- and he said,  
"Are we going to get them, sir?" or something to that effect.

1           At the time, it was -- both of us had this  
2 understanding that this was -- because of the nature of the  
3 ambush. I did the AAR the next day -- I believe was when we did  
4 the AAR. I ran it. And only after I made them draw their  
5 positions on a dry erase board -- not dry -- butcher paper -- it  
6 was only after they started drawing that it kind of started --  
7 you saw where the geometry was -- where the units -- the [REDACTED]  
8 was. That was the first time I'd known they'd split, and I  
9 didn't understand it. And I told them in the AAR -- I said that  
10 I felt like the village idiot because I had no idea what they  
11 were doing. And, when you don't have beacon-forced tracking on  
12 all of your vehicles, you don't -- in any TOC, JOC, whatever,  
13 you may not have complete -- if the mission is completed and  
14 nothing happened, no one would have ever known they'd split or  
15 seen that.

16           But, when we started bringing it out, it was kind of  
17 odd. I mean, it was odd to me. And that was part of the  
18 discussion with the platoon was, "Why did you do this?" And  
19 then only after the fact did [REDACTED] call me and say, "I  
20 think this was a fratricide incident." And that was because he  
was with [REDACTED] and had talked to some of the individuals that

1 were at the site, to include -- I can't remember his name now.  
2 Anyway, he called me, and then he directed that I start a 15-6  
3 from -- wherever -- his forward location.

4 [REDACTED] Okay. Did you ever call down and tell anybody  
5 that you weren't -- you didn't want this vehicle to slow the  
6 operation down?

7 [REDACTED] I told [REDACTED] and I'm sure -- I'm sure out of  
8 frustration. I mean it was the nature of the -- this thing had  
9 been -- we say a lot of things in frustration. And I'm sure I  
10 said something to that effect because this had become our -- I  
11 mean, now I was doing a combat operation with wreckers and  
12 whatever; introducing folks that are not from my unit to help  
13 recover our vehicle. Because -- and there's a little bit of  
14 trust going both ways. We consistently said, "What do you need  
15 to get this" -- we were responding -- we would have delivered an  
16 engine if we had to. And this thing had been routinely -- you  
17 know, it had become kind of now the main effort.

18 [REDACTED] Did you know that [REDACTED] had given the [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED] directions to split the [REDACTED]?

1 [REDACTED]: After the fact, sir. I mean, in the course of  
2 this investigation, yes. I did not know he did that during the  
3 operation.

4 [REDACTED] And what did [REDACTED] explain to you for his  
5 reasoning for that?

6 [REDACTED] He never -- we never engaged in a dialogue on  
7 that, sir. He never told me.

8 [REDACTED] Okay. And the jinga truck plan was developed by  
9 whom?

[REDACTED] That was [REDACTED] forward.

11 [REDACTED] Okay. So [REDACTED] forward; [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED], any idea?

13 [REDACTED] I don't know, sir.

14 [REDACTED] Okay. What type of pre-mission training did the  
15 [REDACTED] have on the use of indigenous forces in [inaudible]  
16 operations?

17 [REDACTED] We didn't have a lot of -- I'm trying to -- I  
18 mean, we've operated with them before; but, as far as specific  
19 training with the AMF?

20 [REDACTED] As an example, identification of friend and foe  
in combat?

1 [REDACTED] I mean, they were [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]. So they know what these guys look like. They  
3 were living together.

4 [REDACTED] So you would say that it was clear that the  
5 soldiers knew what they looked like in uniform?

6 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

7 [REDACTED] Is there anyway to mistake an AMF soldier for a  
8 PCM?

9 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

[REDACTED] And how is that?

11 [REDACTED] They're bearded. They wear -- they have AKs.  
12 They don't always -- they don't follow uniform procedures like  
13 we do. They have uniforms; however, they're a hodgepodge mix of  
14 sometimes -- you know, Army field jackets to whatever. If  
15 they're cold -- they're going to wear what they want to if  
16 they're cold. If they're hot, they'll do the same thing.  
17 They'll shed uniform items. [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] I wouldn't ----

19 [REDACTED] What were the colors of their uniform?

20 [REDACTED] KPF -- I think they had an olive drab type.

Now, I interfaced with their commanding officers at Khowst. And

1 I remember they had olive. They also wore Army camouflage. At  
2 the gates, they had Army camouflage uniforms.

3 [REDACTED] Green camouflage?

4 [REDACTED] Green camouflage.

5 [REDACTED] Did they possess any type of DCU-type uniform or  
6 close to a DCU-type uniform; the guys at BCP 5?

7 [REDACTED] I can't remember, sir. I don't know.

8 [REDACTED] Okay.

9 [REDACTED] I never was at BCP 5, so I can't comment on  
10 what they wore.

11 [REDACTED] All right. When did it become evident to you  
12 that this was a fratricide?

13 [REDACTED] After [REDACTED] talked to me, sir, and  
14 then --

15 [Pause.]

16 [REDACTED] Was that based upon his telling you that he  
17 thought it was a fratricide?

18 [REDACTED] No, sir. When we did the AAR -- I mean, there  
19 was just a lot of -- I think they split their convoy. And I'm  
20 just going to backtrack a little bit to answer one of your  
previous questions. I think they split their convoy because



1 they were going to try to clear the zone potentially and try to  
2 do the vehicle swap at the same time. And my question about  
3 that was -- they didn't have enough combat power to do that  
4 mission. Half of a Ranger [REDACTED] is not a lot of ass; so,  
5 again, that's why I felt like the village idiot in the AAR when  
6 they were briefing that.

7 [REDACTED] Did the [REDACTED] say anything to you about  
8 him objecting to splitting the [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] Oh, yes, sir. He was pissed off. I mean, he  
10 was really pissed. That whole [REDACTED] was pissed off. That's  
11 why we were having this dialogue and we were -- it was almost  
12 like we were on two different planes. I mean, I was briefing  
13 like your OCA trying to be there, and we'd just lost Tillman.  
14 So it was emotion for everybody. And I was not looking forward  
15 to conducting that AAR, simply because of the loss of a Ranger.

16 So, when I was trying to run the AAR and there was  
17 this obviously -- I had just took the resentment or complaints  
18 because the [REDACTED] was in the back of the AAR. And  
19 it seemed like there was shots being thrown, and I just took it  
20 all as, "All right. These guys are pissed off. They just got  
in a firefight." And I was trying to be the -- "Hey, let's

1 smooth this all out." But it was starting to become clear as we  
2 drew this thing out that there was just some -- some things  
3 didn't make sense in terms of ----

4 [REDACTED] From your AAR, what could you discern? Who, in  
5 this specific movement -- okay -- potentially was involved in  
6 this fratricide?

7 [REDACTED] I could discern that the ----

8 [REDACTED] If you would, just draw that out on there?

9 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. We had one element here that was  
10 moving this way. I think they came in contact somewhere on this  
11 "S"; we had a [REDACTED] that had already moved through the kill  
12 zone or halfway through the kill zone.

13 [REDACTED] Would you make that one in red?

14 [Pause.]

15 [REDACTED] And this is what you're discerning from where?

16 You're getting this from the AAR?

17 [REDACTED] This is from the AAR; yes, sir.

18 [REDACTED] Okay.

19 [REDACTED] We had an element that kind of already moved  
through the kill zone. And I'll draw this as the kill zone  
here. So when they came through here, the contact ----

1 [REDACTED] Make that point as "KS" if you would, or "KZ."

2 [Pause.]

3 [REDACTED] So, when they went through the kill zone at  
4 this point -- and this is all secondhand, but what I've heard is  
5 the GMV driver stopped driving. There were some suspicions that  
6 maybe he was in on it.

7 [REDACTED] GMV or ----

8 [REDACTED] I'm sorry; jinga truck. The jinga truck driver  
9 had stopped driving. The explosions were all high on the --  
10 through the terrain. None of them landed inside the valley  
11 floor itself; probably because they're shooting from -- this is  
12 extreme terrain. So it's just hard to drop rounds inside the --  
13 inside the valley floor.

14 This element had begun maneuvering back, and I guess  
15 since they were at this village, [REDACTED] was here, somewhere in this  
16 village and they had begun maneuvering up this valley -- up this  
17 spur or whatever you call it to get in a position where they can  
18 help the rest of their [REDACTED] that's trying to move to the  
19 contact. This platoon picks up, continues to move.

20 And, at this point, what I gather is Tillman's team,  
21 with an AMF KPF soldier, were up on the ridgeline. And what

1 they described was enemy basically surrounding all of the key  
2 highpoints. And as Tillman's team had maneuvered this way, this  
3 element had no idea how far ahead he was in relation to his  
4 [REDACTED] leadership.

5 I was talking to the [REDACTED] on SAT. His [REDACTED]  
6 -- rather than staying at the radio with the X-wing had  
7 dismounted his SAT antennae and maneuvered behind his [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] Tillman and his team ran up here. These guys were  
9 running to the kill zone. Rangers were at -- basically on the  
10 sides of the road to stay out, you know, underneath it.

11 When they ran through, what [REDACTED] described to me  
12 was Tillman had received -- as this element was moving this way,  
13 this element began engaging these guys. So as Tillman or  
14 whoever turns to engage back, it was difficult for the folks at  
15 the base of the hill to discern of the fire -- I mean, these are  
16 steep. It was difficult at 600 feet versus 900 feet to  
17 determine which angle you were shooting at; into the valley  
18 floor or across the ridgeline. At that point is when this  
19 element opened up and when they drew their [REDACTED].

20 [REDACTED]: Why did they engage?

[REDACTED] This?

1 [REDACTED] Uhm-hmm [nodding head to the affirmative].

2 [REDACTED] Because there was -- they believed there was  
3 enemy on this high ground -- and again, this is just what I  
4 thought -- I gathered from the AAR, because even then it wasn't  
5 clear. It was a possibility. I mean, there was definitely a  
6 lot of -- just your maneuver doctrine kind of goes, "Man, we're  
7 shooting crossfire right here against each other."

8 The [REDACTED] thought there was enemy on all portions of  
the high grounds; and now, if there's someone in between -- and  
10 there must have been enemy here because that's what Tillman was  
11 maneuvering on. As he was maneuvering on this enemy here, they  
12 thought they were shot at from this direction here. So, as he  
13 turns to engage this way, from the valley floor, whether there's  
14 enemy at this point or this point, engaging in a certain  
15 direction that's not that way at dusk -- I could see -- I mean,  
16 when they were walking me through this I was like, "I guess I  
17 could see how you couldn't determine if guy's are shooting  
18 straight ahead or down if you're looking just from muzzle  
19 flashes."

1 [REDACTED] For clarity, can you put a circle around where  
2 you think Tillman was?

3 [Pause.]

4 [REDACTED] And the three diamonds are the enemy  
5 locations?

6 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

7 [REDACTED] Red diamonds.

8 [Pause.]

9 [REDACTED] Okay. How do you think the [REDACTED] and the  
10 [REDACTED] were wounded?

11 [REDACTED] I had thought they were shot by enemy. Ever  
12 since -- I mean, this has been 6-7 months now, I've just heard  
13 secondhand it's possible they were shot by their [REDACTED] as  
14 well.

15 [REDACTED] Okay.

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not -- or, [REDACTED] did not think that  
17 when I talked to him. [REDACTED] described these guys as shooting  
18 at him when I saw him at the hospital that night.

19 [REDACTED] These guys meaning ----

20 [REDACTED] As in the enemy at the south side, which he  
21 thought were the same ones that shot Tillman -- or, at least he

1 described to me. You know, I'm visiting him in the hospital.

2 He's shot in the mouth. [REDACTED] shot in the knee.

3 [REDACTED] Did we ever recover any physical evidence that  
4 indicated that they were shot by enemy or friendly?

5 [REDACTED]: Recover any from -- I know we did an autopsy on

6 ----

7 [REDACTED] I'm talking about [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]: No, sir.

9 [REDACTED] So there was no physical evidence that was ever  
10 recovered to determine how they were shot?

11 [REDACTED] No, sir.

12 [REDACTED] Okay.

13 [REDACTED]: Not to my knowledge. I know [REDACTED]  
14 did a 15-6, and he might -- I believe he went back to the site.

15 [REDACTED] What is your -- what were your procedures for  
16 destroying vehicles in the field?

17 [REDACTED]: We didn't, sir. We -- there was one incident  
18 prior when [REDACTED] was killed. That was on a -- near  
19 Nongolam [phonetic] in Afghanistan, and that was like any other  
20 Afghan road. There's one way in, one way out. The terrain was  
-- a bitch on both sides, and we had asked to destroy that vehicle

1 because that was missing its front -- I mean, there was no front  
2 end. The IED exploded right underneath [REDACTED] and it  
3 only had the tail end of a HMMWV anyway.

4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]

11 It made sense. It was a pain in the ass to haul it  
12 out, but we did. We brought it back to [REDACTED] and  
13 recovered that vehicle.

14 [REDACTED] Did you see any reason or need to destroy this  
15 vehicle?

16 [REDACTED] No. I did not, sir.

17 [REDACTED] And your assessment for not destroying in the  
18 field was what? Why would you have ----

19 [REDACTED] Sir, we -- we went through HMMWV A-Arms, and  
20 HMMWV parts, suspensions. To the point where we had the AM  
General folks come and show us how to -- and had we destroyed



1 every HMMWV that was in this shape, the taxpayers -- I mean we  
2 would have gone through a lot of HMMWVs. A HMMWV near Abad  
3 [phonetic] or Conar [phonetic] -- we break HMMWVs all of the  
4 time.

5 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

6 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

7 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

8 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

9 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

10 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

11 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

12 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

13 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

14 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

15 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

16 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

17 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

18 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

19 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

20 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

21 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

1 [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] ----- is to destroy the vehicle in place?

11 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

12 [REDACTED]: Okay. All right. Do you know a [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]?

14 [REDACTED], sir?

15 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] is that it?

16 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] yes, sir.

17 [REDACTED]: And where is he at?

18 [REDACTED]: He is our [REDACTED].

19 [REDACTED]: Is he here?

20 [REDACTED]: He's still in the unit. Yes, sir.

21 [REDACTED]: [Inaudible]

22 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir.

1 [REDACTED] How do you spell his name?

2 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED].

3 [REDACTED]: When the [REDACTED] was back out of the field, I  
4 guess they were at [REDACTED]. Did [REDACTED] address the  
5 soldiers?

6 [REDACTED]: A memorial service?

7 [REDACTED]: Not a memorial service but, I guess ----

8 [REDACTED]: No.

[REDACTED]: ---- as a reunion training piece when they came  
10 back because of the trauma of losing Tillman? Did he talk to  
11 the group collectively?

12 [REDACTED]: He did not, sir. [REDACTED] flew in; the  
13 [REDACTED].

14 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED].

15 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir. [REDACTED] was -- I want to say  
16 he was either in Luwara -- because they flew in a Navy psych and  
17 the [REDACTED] the [REDACTED].

18 [REDACTED]: And the [REDACTED] is? Is that [REDACTED]?

19 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED].

1 [REDACTED]: Do you know if [REDACTED] ever made the comment to  
2 the group of soldiers in the [REDACTED] that they were all to  
3 collectively share the blame for this death?

4 [REDACTED] No, sir.

5 [REDACTED] Okay. Were soldiers directed not to talk about  
6 this incident?

7 [REDACTED] No, sir.

8 [Pause.]

9 [REDACTED] Are you talking amongst each other, or to the  
10 media, or to ----

11 [REDACTED] I guess what I'm getting at is actually what was  
12 the direction to the soldiers reference this investigation and  
13 the incident involving Corporal Tillman?

14 [REDACTED] We didn't talk to the media. I mean, at that  
15 point [REDACTED] said we're going to do a 15-6, and we began  
16 the 15-6, and life went on. [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]: But was there a -- if the unit had a purpose for  
20 making that statement, what would that purpose be?

1 [REDACTED] We didn't -- short of talking to the media, we  
2 didn't give any -- I mean, guys were conducting ops. They were  
3 talking about it, and we were talking about it in the TOC.

4 [REDACTED]: Okay. So no one was directed not to talk about  
5 it?

6 [REDACTED] No, sir. No, sir.

7 [REDACTED] Was anyone directed not to talk about the  
8 investigation?

9 [REDACTED]: No, sir.

10 [REDACTED]: Okay.

11 [REDACTED]: I mean they brought in guys from Regiment to do  
12 it.

13 [REDACTED]: Okay. When you bring a soldier out of the  
14 field, the term had been used "packaged for movement." What is  
15 the SOP for bringing back a KIA from the field? How do you  
16 handle that?

17 [REDACTED] I'm probably going to miss some stuff, sir; but  
18 I know they put them on the Skedco. They try to secure all of  
19 his equipment. They EXFILL all of his items with him as best as  
20 they can, and he goes to the FST.

[REDACTED] Do you know the medic that worked on Tillman?

1 [REDACTED] I do not, sir.

2 [REDACTED] Okay. Do you know who prepared him for movement  
3 from the ambush site back to [REDACTED]?

4 [REDACTED] I do not, sir.

5 [REDACTED] Does your SOP call for you to remove the uniform  
6 from the soldier after he'd been killed in action?

7 [REDACTED] The uniform; I don't think so, sir. I think  
8 all of his articles of clothing that were removed were removed  
9 at the CASH to treat him. I mean, if they've got to get to he  
10 wound, they'll do whatever they can to pull that stuff off.

11 [REDACTED] Even if he's KIA on the scene?

12 [REDACTED] I'd imagine, sir, if there was a medic working  
13 on him, they may have pulled his clothes off to work on him.

14 [REDACTED] Okay. Were you at Salerno when he returned?

15 [REDACTED] I was.

16 [REDACTED] Okay. Did you see the body at that time?

17 [REDACTED] No, sir. I was still SEEKSUING [phonetic] the  
18 op. And then [REDACTED], I don't know exactly if we  
19 met it or if the medic -- the FST met the aircraft. But him and  
20 I went and laid the flag on him. When I went to lay the flag on  
him, he was already in a bag. I could see his boots.

1 [REDACTED] The what?  
2 [REDACTED] I could see his boots.  
3 [REDACTED] And his boots were on him?  
4 [REDACTED] They were covered in blood. I mean, it was ---  
5 -  
6 [REDACTED] Okay. Do you know anything about his body  
7 armor?  
8 [REDACTED] His body armor?  
9 [REDACTED] Uhm-hmm [nodding head to the affirmative].  
10 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. I mean, his body armor was recovered  
11 back to Salerno.  
12 [REDACTED] Okay. Do you know anything about his body armor  
13 being burned?  
14 [REDACTED] I do. I do. I heard it was burned at Khowst.  
15 [REDACTED] Who directed that?  
16 [REDACTED] I don't know.  
17 [REDACTED] Was his uniform burned?  
18 [REDACTED] I think so, sir. I think all of his equipment  
19 -- I mean it was -- he was -- it was all saturated in blood.  
20 That's, I guess, what I'd call it. And, at the time -- I'm  
aware they burned it. At the time, it didn't seem alarming to

1 any of us, because we didn't know it was a fratricide concern.  
2 We weren't going to haul around -- and I guess, at this point,  
3 he'd already been -- been zipped up and put on ice literally at  
4 the FST. And there was no reason for any of us to haul around  
5 his uniforms and that.

6 [REDACTED] Did anybody mention to you or the company  
7 commander that there were green tip markings on the Ranger body  
8 armor?

[REDACTED] No, sir.

9 [REDACTED] Did anyone say that the [REDACTED] held it  
11 up and showed it to another sergeant and said, "It's got green  
12 tip markings on it?"

13 [REDACTED] Not that I'm aware of, sir.

14 [REDACTED] All right. Is that normal procedure?

15 [REDACTED] To ----

16 [REDACTED]: To destroy the body armor, destroy the uniforms?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

18 [REDACTED]: That is your SOP?

19 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir. If it -- I mean, we don't haul that  
20 around with us.



1 [REDACTED] Did anybody ever talk about the preservation of  
2 physical evidence?

3 [REDACTED] Has anyone talked to me about it, sir?

4 [REDACTED] Well, I'm talking about in cases like this when  
5 your soldiers are killed in combat, the potential preservation  
6 of physical evidence to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that  
7 it was in fact that they were killed by enemy fire or  
8 potentially friendly fire?

9 [REDACTED] No, sir. And we'd only, to this point, had one  
10 casualty before. I mean, our battalion's been fortunate. We  
11 had [REDACTED] and that was it. And we did a lot of the same  
12 things because his legs were blown off, and it was just very  
13 similar. So the leg pants that were -- they were burned. It  
14 was the same type routine. I mean, we didn't want to haul  
15 around his bloody MICH helmet and all of that stuff.

16 With Tillman, at that point in time, I certainly  
17 didn't know and I think a lot of the folks back at Khovst had no  
18 idea. Because we were pissed off. We wanted to go back in and  
19 take it to the enemy.

1           And, again, with one casualty before that, I had never  
2 heard of -- I don't think any of the Rangers would have heard of  
3 preserving evidence for an investigation.

4           ██████████ I wasn't necessarily talking about preserving  
5 evidence to complete the investigation but if you know -- if  
6 somebody knows that potentially this could have occurred and  
7 they had a question in their mind, I would think they would  
8 pause and think, "Maybe I need to let somebody else look at this  
9 before we burn it."

10          ██████████ We know now, sir; or I know now. We had -- at  
11 the time, we didn't have any indication that this was a  
12 friendly-fire incident.

13          ██████████ Okay. Who directed the investigation?

14          ██████████: ██████████ did, sir.

15          ██████████ And who did he direct do it?

16          ██████████: He told me. Oh, he told me to initiate it.

17 And I told him that I planned on appointing ██████████,

18 and he said that was a good choice.

19          ██████████: Okay. And did ██████████ start an

20 investigation?

██████████ He did, sir.

1 [REDACTED] Okay. And when did [REDACTED] finish his  
2 investigation?

3 [REDACTED]: I want to say it took him probably a week, sir.  
4 And my timings are shady at best; but I think it was a good week  
5 or so, maybe 10 days.

6 [REDACTED] And did [REDACTED] go out to the location?

7 [REDACTED] No, sir. I don't think he did.

8 [REDACTED] Okay. Did anybody associated with the  
9 investigation visit the site?

10 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir. When the [REDACTED] took over, they -- I'm  
11 99 percent positive that his intention -- that he went to the  
12 site, because I know he got some photographs after the fact.

13 [REDACTED] Okay. So the [REDACTED] took it over from [REDACTED]?

14 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]?

16 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

17 [REDACTED] And why did he take it over from [REDACTED]?

18 [REDACTED] I think because we knew this was -- we were  
19 still conducting combat operations, and Regiment was there to  
20 help us out. [REDACTED] knew -- I mean, it was a high  
profile casualty. And I think [REDACTED] was confirming that it

1 was a fratricide event, and it -- they just took it over. I  
2 want to say this was going to become a CENTCOM approving 15-6.  
3 So we just didn't have the staff, manning to put something  
4 together. So literally they brought the -- and we don't have a  
5 lawyer in our [REDACTED]. So Regiment has a [REDACTED]. To us, it  
6 seemed like the right thing to do.

7 [REDACTED] Now, you said [REDACTED] was -- did he come to  
8 the determination that he thought it was fratricide?

9 [REDACTED] I think so. I never saw his 15-6 because,  
10 literally, the [REDACTED] -- and I was still fighting operations. So  
11 that was -- you know, we were trying to maintain -- not stop  
12 everything for this because we knew we were going to get to the  
13 -- we knew we would find out when we would find out. It was  
14 also important for us to get the platoon back in the fight  
15 because it was just healthy for the guys.

16 [REDACTED] Did [REDACTED] say anything to you about this  
17 being fratricide?

18 [REDACTED] I'm sure he did. I'm sure he -- I mean, at  
19 that point, it was in our heads. It was in all of our heads  
20 when [REDACTED] called me and talked to folks that were on  
the scene. So I'm certain we talked about it.

1 [REDACTED] Okay. Do you recall when that was?

2 [REDACTED] I do not, sir. Probably within a few days of  
3 him starting it off. It took him -- he was -- he was coming to  
4 me to ask me -- he was very concerned about, you know, beginning  
5 the investigation without [REDACTED] there, just because it  
6 was delicate. It was a fratricide incident, and it was the  
7 first one any of us had had to deal with. It was my first time  
8 hearing about a fratricide incident.

9 So I didn't know, and I didn't know what that was  
10 based on because [REDACTED] had talked face-to-face with  
11 individuals. So I told [REDACTED] I was going to recommend  
12 not having [REDACTED] get started -- [REDACTED] -- until [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED] had time to share that information with him so he knew  
14 what his guidance was going to be for proceeding. And that was  
15 only a day or 2 later. And then [REDACTED] periodically sought advice  
16 from me. I was the 3 at the time.

17 [REDACTED] Okay. So let me go back to this. So, after  
18 Tillman came back, you did your AAR. And then based upon your  
19 AAR, which was a day later, you didn't come to a confirmed  
20 conclusion but apparently you thought there was potential  
21 fratricide?

1 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

2 [REDACTED] Okay. Then how soon after that did [REDACTED] call  
3 you concerned about fratricide?

4 [REDACTED] It was the next morning; the next morning Z  
5 time. So the next day.

6 [REDACTED] So the 14th is when the event occurred?

7 [REDACTED] The 22d I think it was.

8 [REDACTED] The 22d.

9 [REDACTED] 22 April; yes, sir.

10 [REDACTED] 22 April, and then the 23d ----

11 [REDACTED] Was ----

12 [REDACTED]: ---- your AAR?

13 [REDACTED]: They were coming back. I'm pretty sure we did  
14 the AAR the next night.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. So then the 24th was the day that [REDACTED]  
16 called you?

17 [REDACTED]: Uhm-hmm [nodding head to the affirmative].

18 [REDACTED] He was concerned it was fratricide?

19 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

20 [REDACTED] And, at that point in time, you appointed [REDACTED]

-----

1 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

2 [REDACTED] ---- to do the investigation?

3 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

4 [REDACTED] How soon after [REDACTED] started did he come up with  
5 a similar conclusion, based upon his investigation, that this  
6 was potentially fratricide?

7 [REDACTED]: Gee, sir, it would be a guess; probably within  
8 the first day or so.

9 [REDACTED] Okay. And then from that point, when did the  
10 Regimental [REDACTED] pick it up?

11 [REDACTED] I want to say it was a week maybe.

12 [REDACTED] All right.

13 [REDACTED] I think we presented them [REDACTED] s ----

14 [REDACTED]: Initial findings?

15 [REDACTED] Initial findings; and that served as his basis  
16 to ----

17 [Pause.]

18 [REDACTED] Okay. What was the urgency for completing the  
19 mission that the [REDACTED] had down around Manah?

20 [REDACTED]: We were on a -- we had already begun planning  
[REDACTED] and they were now the only [REDACTED]

1 So we did not want to leave a [REDACTED] for any length or period  
2 of time in there. [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] Was this urgency being directed by anyone from  
7 higher, or was this urgency just ----

8 [REDACTED] I mean, [REDACTED] was pushing us pretty  
9 hard to keep moving, but that was not surprising.

10 [REDACTED] Okay. [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] No, sir. [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] If we -- only when we -- like, for example [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] we'll pick -- the [REDACTED] will make his

20 best guess. [REDACTED] And

[REDACTED]



1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Had the [REDACTED] Officer -- or, was the [REDACTED]  
11 Officer ever relieved or removed from his duties based upon  
12 anything related to this specific mission?

13 [REDACTED] No, sir. I put him in for a Bronze Star. He  
14 put a -- he cracked the code. That area of Khovst is still very  
15 successful or is still a success story for the Ranger Regiment  
16 in terms of our [REDACTED] That is  
17 largely responsible -- due to the analysis of [REDACTED], the  
18 [REDACTED] Officer.

19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED] We turned to him. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He was --

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]g.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. Do you have [REDACTED]'s report  
16 anywhere?

17 [REDACTED] Do I have his report?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 [REDACTED] I do not, sir.

20 [REDACTED] Do you know who does?

1 [REDACTED] I could ask [REDACTED]. I know he provided  
2 it to Regiment, and they took it because that had the original  
3 statements. And we didn't have copy machine there. So I'm not  
4 sure if ----

5 [REDACTED] Is the [REDACTED] in Benning?

6 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

7 [REDACTED] Do you know if he's forward or is he at Benning  
8 now?

9 [REDACTED] I don't know, sir. I can find out.

10 [REDACTED] Okay. What about the [REDACTED]? Do we know the  
11 name of the Navy psych who came out and talked to the guys?

12 [REDACTED]: No, sir. Because that was a source of -- no  
13 one asked for him, and that's not routine. Normally, it's not  
14 routine that you send a psych to contact. If we did that,  
15 psychs would be all over the battlefield. No one wanted to talk  
16 to him. So he just kind of sat there, and then he left a day  
17 later, probably pissed off that he'd been shuttled over there  
18 and shuttled all the way back.

19 [REDACTED] What about notification of the family reference  
20 the death of Tillman? Do you know who did that?

1 [REDACTED] I'm trying to remember who was on the Rear  
2 Detachment then. I do not. I think [REDACTED] was the Rear-D  
3 Commander at the time, and [REDACTED] was back. I don't  
4 know who physically told her.

5 [REDACTED] Okay. How many people knew that this was  
6 suspected fratricide?

7 [REDACTED] How many? At this point, myself, [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] probably the [REDACTED] once we started -- I mean,  
9 immediately we were doing the 15-6. Immediately, they're going  
10 to start figuring that out. I don't know how many in the  
11 [REDACTED] did from the way they were [inaudible] initially. I did  
12 not tell anyone beyond [REDACTED] as I directed he conduct  
13 the investigation into that. I don't know who in the rear. I  
14 personally did not tell anyone, "Hey, this is" -- you know, I  
15 don't know who in the rear would have known.

16 [REDACTED] Okay.

17 [REDACTED] I'm sure at some point, [REDACTED]  
18 may have known from talking to his commander, but I don't know  
19 when that would have occurred.

20 [REDACTED] A notification tem, when they were to deliver  
the message to the [REDACTED] family that Tillman had been killed

1 -- what were their instructions in telling the family -- what;  
2 that he was killed how?

3 [REDACTED] I'm sure they told them -- I don't know what  
4 instructions were given, but I wrote his Silver Star. And that  
5 was at about the same time the notification was occurring, so --  
6 and I wrote the Silver Star fully thinking it was valorous duty  
7 -- valorous actions and, you know, wounds from the enemy. So  
8 I'm sure that was going on at the same time.

9 So there was no one that was directing anything  
10 reference -- beyond our normal -- you know, you can't leave --  
11 you can't tell specifics. You can -- I mean there's a normal --  
12 they're briefed on, "You'll be notified by a guy in Class A's.  
13 He won't be able to give you much, but they'll begin the  
14 casualty assistnace." It's focused more on, "How do we assist  
15 the family?" not "This is what happened."

16 [REDACTED] Did anybody ever convey to the family prior to  
17 notification of fratricide that Tillman had been killed by enemy  
18 fire?

19 [REDACTED] They probably did, sir.

20 [REDACTED] Okay. Did anybody explain to them -- to the  
family -- that Tillman was performing heroically?

1 [REDACTED] I'm sure they did, sir. He was. I mean, he  
2 was running up the hill, leading his fire team. And he was in  
3 such physical shape that he was able to get up some pretty  
4 significant terrain in a pretty short amount of time.

5 [REDACTED] Okay. So he was killed running up the hill?

6 [REDACTED] He was killed maneuvering. How he was actually  
7 facing or whatever -- but he maneuvered his fire team like a  
8 good team leader was expected to do.

9 [REDACTED] Did anyone direct you to put him in for a Silver  
Star?

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did, but it was not -- it made  
12 sense.

13 [REDACTED] I understand. Look, I'm just -- I'm asking the  
14 facts. I mean, I'm not trying to get into why, when -- just did  
15 they? If they did, that's what I want to know.

16 [REDACTED] My suspicion arised [sic] only, sir, because I  
17 know the family asked why he put him in for an award. I firmly  
18 believed he deserved it, and I told -- at the time, because I  
19 had jumped with Pat Tillman. I'd OC'd his platoon in live fires  
20 and he's -- he was a great American.

1 [REDACTED] And I'm not -- it's not my motivation to second  
2 guess why somebody was put in for a Silver Star. My only  
3 question was: Did someone direct that you put in for a Silver  
4 Star?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. [REDACTED] did.

6 [REDACTED] Okay. So [REDACTED] directed that he be put  
7 in for a Silver Star?

8 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

9 [REDACTED] And you prepared the Silver Star citation?

[REDACTED] I did, sir.

11 [REDACTED] Okay. And that was based upon the facts that  
12 you knew at that time?

13 [REDACTED] That's correct, sir.

14 [REDACTED] Who conveyed those facts to you?

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] -- you know, I asked input  
16 from him because he was still back with me at Khowst. And we  
17 knew the operational piece. The Silver Start write-up doesn't  
18 have a lot of the details of the event. It's more of the  
19 overall what we knew. He was killed in action but didn't  
20 specify details of this incident. It was more of an operational  
write-up.

1 [REDACTED] When exactly did you do the Silver Star?

2 [REDACTED] It was the next morning. It was before the  
3 AAR. It was the next morning.

4 [REDACTED] And after the AAR, did that have any bearing on  
5 your decision to follow through with the Silver Star?

6 [REDACTED] We modified some of the verbiage because you  
7 know, I'll be honest with you, sir, I put what I thought had  
8 happened. So some of the verbiage describes the actions in  
9 combat fighting an enemy. And in good conscious I couldn't  
10 write, "Killed by the enemy," on a Silver Start citation that 30  
11 years down the road the family would spit on because it may have  
12 been fratricide. So we modified the writing a little bit, but  
13 that was it.

14 [REDACTED] I got it. That's kind of what I'm looking for.  
15 I'm looking for the facts not -- and I appreciate your honesty  
16 because that's what I'm looking for here. I'm not looking for  
17 you to try to sugarcoat something. I want you to tell me the  
18 truth.

19 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

20 [REDACTED] Okay. I got it. It's clear to me. Clear to  
you?



1 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

2 [REDACTED] Okay. Let me see here. Is there anything you  
3 can think of, [REDACTED] that was left out here that you want  
4 to address with me?

5 [REDACTED] If you'll give me a second to think, sir?

6 [Pause.]

7 [REDACTED] Not off the top of my head, sir. No. I think  
8 -- I think it was a confusing situation. It was confusing at  
9 all levels. I mean, it was -- I think that became pretty clear  
after the fact when we did the AAR, but I think I covered that  
11 already. I really don't think -- unless you have any questions,  
12 sir, I really can't think of anything.

13 [REDACTED] When Tillman was recovered to Salerno, he was  
14 brought directly back to Salerno?

15 [REDACTED] Uhm-hmm [nodding head to the affirmative].

16 [REDACTED] The same day, right -- same night?

17 [REDACTED] That night; yes, sir.

18 [REDACTED] When [REDACTED] was brought out?

19 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

20 [REDACTED] Do you know who burned the uniform and the body  
armor?

1 [REDACTED] I do not, sir. I know it was burned. I don't  
2 know who did it.

3 [REDACTED] And when? Do you know when it was burned?

4 [REDACTED]: I think it was the next day. I don't think it  
5 hung around. I mean, everyone was --, there was a state of shock  
6 the next day. And I think there were a lot of folks that --  
7 "Hey, this equipment's all -- you know, it's all soaked in  
8 blood." And I think there were a lot of emotions -- "Hey, let's  
9 get rid of this," and whatever. From the description of it,  
10 there were pieces of [REDACTED] [sic] on it, not just blood. It was  
11 pretty -- it was something that I think we thought was the right  
12 thing to do.

13 [REDACTED] Okay. Let's go back to the AAR, and the reason  
14 I'm asking you this is I want to try to make sure if there's  
15 anything that came out in the AAR that we didn't talk about here  
16 -- that we make sure that we get it.

17 [REDACTED] Sure, sir.

18 [REDACTED] You said that the atmosphere in the AAR was  
19 somewhat tense?

20 [REDACTED] Uhm-hmm [nodding head to the affirmative].

1 [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] back there, and you kind  
2 of over here mediating, and the [REDACTED] was very adamant  
3 about not wanting to split his force, things of that nature.  
4 Did anything come out of that AAR that was striking to you, that  
5 concerned you?

6 [REDACTED] That whole miscommunication; yes, sir. That's  
7 the crux. For me, as a [REDACTED] that was the crux of the  
8 whole -- I mean, I can't comment specifically on what happened  
9 here because I know what I know on a radio.

10 But the order, you know, to -- after the fact, I  
11 remember his [REDACTED] was relaying guidance on [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED]

18 So, yes, sir. If you asked me what my biggest concern  
19 of the AAR was, it was the miscommunication from battalion to  
20 [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] Any accusations made in the course of the AAR  
2 that we didn't bring out here?

3 [REDACTED] I think they were accusing us of directing them  
4 to split up.

5 [REDACTED] Okay. The [REDACTED] was ----

6 [REDACTED] Right. But, as far as accusations on shots  
7 fired or ----

8 [REDACTED] I'm just talking about in general.

9 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

10 [REDACTED] As you listened to the AAR -- the tone of the  
11 AAR, the shots that were going back and forth as you eluded to  
12 earlier -- anything that stood out and struck you as an  
13 accusation on the part of anybody in relationship to that AAR  
14 process?

15 [REDACTED] I think that was it, sir, that they accused --  
16 and I think the platoon thought I told them to do it. And I  
17 never once talked to [REDACTED] until he was shot, and I was  
18 talking to him on the SAT after the fact.

19 So I grabbed [REDACTED] afterwards and said, you know,  
20 "What the -- what the hell is going on here?" And then he told  
me, "I thought you told me to do it." So that -- I mean that

1 was after the fact. And I said, "[REDACTED] we worked on this plan  
2 together, and that was never my" -- I mean that was kind of the  
3 whole -- so that disconnect that happened there certainly that  
4 was -- for me that was the crux of the issue at my level.

5 [REDACTED] What about [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] being  
6 wounded; any indication of how they were wounded?

7 [REDACTED] No, sir. I knew -- I knew when [REDACTED] wasn't  
8 talking on the radio anymore that he was wounded or suspected he  
9 was because he was the first one that was talking. He was  
10 talking, and I could tell he was talking messed up. And, like I  
11 said, I purposely sought him out at the CASH or the FST and  
12 sought out [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] But did he tell you that he thought he'd been  
14 fired upon from across the ridgeline?

15 [REDACTED] He did. When I tried to imagine how this  
16 happened, I was -- I firmly believed it happened from an enemy  
17 on the south end of the ridgeline.

18 [REDACTED] And he told you that?

19 [REDACTED] Uhm-hmm [nodding head to the affirmative]. He  
20 described the situation as best as he could recall it.

[REDACTED] And he informed you that he observed fire ----

1 [REDACTED] He did.

2 [REDACTED]: ---- and thought he was hit from the other  
3 ridgeline? Okay. All right. Anything else?

4 [REDACTED] No, sir.

5 [REDACTED] Okay. I'll just remind you that this is still  
6 an open and official investigation.

7 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

8 [REDACTED] You're not to discuss this with anyone. I  
9 appreciate your candor and I appreciate your time. Sorry we had  
10 to keep you here so late.

11 [REDACTED]: No, sir. It's the right thing to do.

12 [REDACTED] This has been directed by the Secretary of the  
13 Army for us to fill in some of the gaps that have been addressed  
14 from other venues, and the bottom line is we're just trying to  
15 find out the facts.

16 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. I understand.

17 [REDACTED] I don't have anything else. I appreciate it.

18 [REDACTED]: Hooah, sir. All the way.

19 [REDACTED] All the way.

20 [END OF INTERVIEW]

[END OF PAGE]

1 [REDACTED] U. S. Army, was recalled as a witness on 18 Nov 04, was reminded of his  
2 oath and testified as follow:

3 Questions by IO:

4 Q. When did you believe the AAR took place that you led--that led you to believe that  
5 fratricide took place?

6 A. I thought it was the next day.

7 Q. Are you sure about that?

8 A. I can't remember. It was either the next day or the day after. It was one or two days--  
it was pretty close after--as soon as we could get those guys back. I can't remember, sir. I'm pretty  
10 sure it was either that day or the next day.

11 Q. Was there more than AAR that you attended on this?

12 A. No. I conducted the one AAR at [REDACTED] level. I don't know if the [REDACTED] did one  
13 internally, but I ran the [REDACTED] AAR.

14 Q. I want you to think back on this and try to lock down in your mind the day that this  
15 occurred. The incident occurred on the 22nd of April of 04. If it was to have occurred on the next  
16 day, it would have been the 23rd.

17 A. The incident happened at about 14Z on the 22nd, which was dusk. They were in the  
18 field that--let's see, Tuesday, in the field that night. We probably recovered them the next night,  
19 actually, which would have mean that they would have got in on the night of the 23rd, which would  
mean the AAR would be on the afternoon of the 24th. I may have lost a day in there, but I know as  
21 soon as the [REDACTED] came back, I did the AAR within--I think--I think that afternoon.

1 Q. Who first told you they believed that fratricide was possible?

2 A. [REDACTED] on the red line.

3 Q. And what day did he say that?

4 A. It was after the AAR, so it would have been the 25th. The morning of the 25th.

5 Q. Now, you said that the AAR led you to suspect fratricide.

6 A. It wasn't so much fratricide as some fishy maneuvering. I didn't--you know, I didn't  
7 know what--it was just very odd. I mean, like I said, I felt like I was the village idiot during the  
8 whole AAR, because I was unaware that the [REDACTED] was split, didn't know--and then when they  
described their maneuver, it seemed like it was possible.

9 Q. And you believe that the Ranger body armor and the MOLLE were burned before the  
10 suspected fratricide?  
11

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Are you aware that [REDACTED] inspected the MOLLE and found  
14 fragmentation in the MOLLE?

15 A. I am not, no, sir. It was described to me as having a lot of blood and part of Tillman's  
16 body parts.

17 [REDACTED] then warned the witness concerning discussion of the open investigation. The witness was  
18 excused and withdrew.



1 [REDACTED] returned as a witness on 18 Nov 04 and was reminded he was still under oath:

2 [REDACTED] --just--yeah, you focused specifically on time-lines and I was trying to--I was  
3 making notes, all right, to map this out, because I'm getting confused. It was seven months ago and I  
4 know you guys looking at this for the first time have to be getting confused. So I think, when I look  
5 back on it, it was two days. The [REDACTED] returned--I had the ambush listed on the night of the 22nd,  
6 at dusk, between the period of darkness and daylight. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] went, that period of  
7 darkness, to link up with them. The next daylight, we did a TOC AAR, and then I think that's the  
8 day we sent Tillman's remains with Tillman to Bagrim on a helicopter. [REDACTED] I believe [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] and the next day--I put a question mark, because I was trying to  
10 remember, but then, as I was thinking through this, [REDACTED] was at the AAR, so I may have waited a  
11 day between doing the [REDACTED] AAR and the return of [REDACTED]. That's where I was getting confused  
12 and I wrote the note on the bottom-- [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that went with [REDACTED] [phonetic] stayed  
13 another night, as best as I can recall, because we were trying to determine what had happened. So  
14 the AAR would have been--I know you were asking what dates that the AAR would have really  
15 been, no earlier than the 25th.

16 [REDACTED] That makes sense.

17 [REDACTED] Sir, I didn't want you to I was withholding anything and I just looked back and  
18 I was like this is-- --

19 [REDACTED] We're just trying to make sure that--one of our requirements is that we've got to  
make sure that we get the time-line down solid as to what happened from day one to the end. And  
we're trying to reconcile--the first time you talked to us, you told us that the AAR was the next day.

1 UV: Right.

2 [REDACTED] And then when we talked to the troops, they told us that they were out there  
3 another night. And then they had to do an SSE the next day and then they came back the following  
4 night, we weren't matching up here.


5 UV: Yes, sir, for me, it seemed like it was all a whirlwind, but now I remember my priority  
6 that first day was taking care of Tillman and his brother and his remains, so that's why I lost a day  
7 probably. So I don't--I wanted to get that to you, sir, and I didn't mean to take any more of your  
8 time.

[REDACTED] This chart was prepared by you?

[REDACTED] I wrote it when I got back.?

11 [REDACTED] I want you to print your name, sign it and date it for us.


12 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir. I was confused a lot when we just talked, and I was like how am I  
13 wrong on the time-line, so I just wanted to make sure you were straight, sir.



PRINT NAME \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_



- CO CDR w/ [redacted] + [redacted] ? RTB 25 APR ?
- BC TO SITE - DRYCART 23 APR

[Large redacted block]

MAS, IN

18 NOV 04