The Numbers

2001 record: 65-97, .401 (27th overall) 2001 expected record*: 68-94 Runs scored: 729, 10th in AL Runs allowed: 858, 11th in AL Run differential: -129 (25th overall) Starters' ERA: 5.01, 10th in AL Bullpen ERA: 4.61, 11th in AL Payroll (Opening Day): $35.6 million (25th overall) Local broadcast revenue: $6.5 million (28th overall) Attendance: 1.54 million (27th overall) 3-year record: 206-279, .425 (28th overall) 5-year record: 345-462, .428 (28th overall) * based on runs scored and runs allowed

2001 in review
What went right
Carlos Beltran, that's what. The 1999 Rookie of the Year followed up a disappointing sophomore season with a brilliant campaign, and looks like a future superstar. Raul Ibanez came out of nowhere to give the Royals a productive lefty bat. Also, middle relievers Jason Grimsley and Cory Bailey combined for a 3.23 ERA in 148 innings.

What went wrong
Coming off a fine 2000 season, Mac Suzuki struggled terribly, lost his spot in the rotation and was traded to the Rockies. Jermaine Dye, not playing particularly well, was traded to Oakland in a three-team deal and immediately became a star again; in return the Royals got Neifi Perez, just the sort of out machine they didn't need. Corner outfielders Mark Quinn and Dee Brown were horrible at the plate and in the field. Young starting pitchers Chris George, Dan Reichert, and Chad Durbin -- supposedly the key to the future -- all pitched poorly, combining for a 5.29 ERA.

In retrospect, the critical decisions were:
1. Bringing back Tony Muser -- affectionately known as "Tony Loser" to many Royals fans -- for yet another season. Perhaps management was fooled by a respectable 2000 season built on a shaky foundation of high batting averages. Or perhaps management simply doesn't know a major-league manager from a Tonka truck.

2. Trading an All-Star right fielder for a shortstop who can't hit. Sending Dye to Oakland didn't work on the field, and it didn't work at the box office, as fans saw yet another star dispatched because the club supposedly couldn't afford to pay him.

3. Standing pat with the lineup. There was reason to think young outfielders Brown and Quinn would improve in 2001, but both were dreadful. Joe Randa was also terrible, and the Royals got little production from their middle infielders, leaving Mike Sweeney and Beltran to carry the load. As a result, the Royals, who play in a hitter's park, dropped from fifth in the league in run production to 10th.

Looking ahead to 2002
Three key questions
1. Who's in the rotation? Jeff Suppan is, if nothing else, a consistent innings-eater and the No. 1 starter by default. But after Suppan the Royals have nine viable candidates for the remaining four rotation slots. Granted, none of the nine are going to make anybody forget Bret Saberhagen. But all have points in their favor, and the first big test for the Royals this spring will be sorting out all the arms in camp.

2. Will Quinn play? And if he does play, will he draw a walk? Quinn earned a regular job with a fine rookie season in 2000. But his already-questionable plate discipline became something of a joke in 2001, as he finished the season with only 12 walks in 473 plate appearances and went 58 straight games without an unintentional walk. Quinn will have to fight for playing time this year, as the Royals signed Michael Tucker to play right field.

3. Can Chuck Knoblauch help change the swing-first-and-ask-questions-later hitting philosophy that's ruled the club since Muser arrived? Even though he's nothing like the hitter he once was, Knoblauch's plate discipline remains superior to all of his new teammates', and there's a slim hope that he'll teach them something.

Can expect to play better
Nobody, unless you consider the possibility that Jose Rosado, who last pitched early in the 2000 season, will give the Royals at least a few quality innings in 2002.

Stats Corner
Carlos Beltran (above) stole 31 bases ... and was thrown out trying just once. Donnie Sadler, A.J. Hinch and Endy Chavez combined for a .161 batting average in 299 at-bats. Staff ace Jeff Suppan led the Royals with 10 victories, 120 strikeouts and a 4.37 ERA. K.C. leadoff hitters combined for a .282 on-base percentage, worst in the majors.

Can expect to play worse
At 29, Raul Ibanez posted an 847 OPS after entering the season with a 678 career mark. He'll open this season as the club's regular DH, but will lose that job by June.

Projected lineup
LF Chuck Knoblauch
SS Neifi Perez
CF Carlos Beltran
1B Mike Sweeney
DH Raul Ibanez
3B Joe Randa
RF Michael Tucker / Mark Quinn
C Brent Mayne
2B Carlos Febles

Rotation
Jeff Suppan
Chad Durbin
Paul Byrd
Darrell May
Chris George

Closer
Roberto Hernandez

A closer look
If you ask a typical baseball fan what's wrong with the Kansas City Royals, the most likely answer is, "Who?"

After you remind him, he'll say, "Oh, them. Their problem is that they can't compete financially."

That's the stock answer, popularized by Commissioner Bud Selig and Royals general manager Allard Baird, among others. As an excuse, it's both convenient and accurate ... to a point. Because while a number of teams operate under severe financial limitations, only two teams have been worse than the Royals over the last three years. And those were the basket-case franchises located -- at least for the time being -- in Montreal and St. Petersburg.

So what's really wrong with the Royals? The answer is exceedingly simple, yet it continues to elude the decision-makers in Kansas City.

Essentially, the Royals have too many hitters who don't draw walks or hit home runs, and they have too many pitchers who allow too many walks and home runs.

A year ago, I invented something called "Beane Count," in honor of Oakland GM Billy Beane. Beane Count simply sums up a team's league rank in home runs hit, walks drawn, home runs allowed, and walks allowed. The lower the number, the better.

It's a junk stat, not intended to stand the test of time or provide any sort of universal enlightenment. However, occasionally it can tell us something profound, and so it does with the Royals and Beane's Athletics.

The following chart lists the records and payrolls for the Royals and Athletics over the last two seasons:

             W-L      Payroll
Royals     142-182  $59 million
Athletics  193-130  $66 million

We see that the Athletics won 51 more games (and lost 52 fewer) than the Royals over the last two seasons, but that the Athletics didn't spend a lot more money. So what's the difference?

In 2000, the Athletics had the best Beane Count in the American League; the Royals had the worst.

In 2001, the Athletics again had the best Beane Count in the American League; the Royals again had the worst.

We could, in evaluating the Royals' chances in 2002 and beyond, focus on the dumb trades in recent years, the talented young pitchers who never seem to develop, letting Tony Muser continue to manage a major-league baseball team, or any one of a dozen other sad stories.

But in the end, it all comes down to this: the men who run the organization, from the manager to the general manager and everybody in between, simply don't understand the value of walks and home runs. And that's why the Royals won't be competitive until a great number of changes are made, both on the field and in the front office.

Rob Neyer is a Senior Writer at ESPN.com, and his column appears three times per week in the offseason.