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| Monday, December 31 Updated: January 4, 3:34 PM ET More December 2001 Archives By Rob Neyer ESPN.com |
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MONDAY, DEC. 31
Quick question about the M's next year. Jeff Cirillo's road stats over the past few years don't really suggest a huge advantage over David Bell. Total OPS of about 780 (Cirillo) over 745 (Bell). By most statistical accounts, Cirillo is the better player, and he has a huge edge in career OBP. But Cirillo is 32, where Bell is 29. Are the Mariners really solving their "problem" at third base? Or was it just a problem of relativity in that Bell was the poorest hitter in a very strong lineup?
There's no question, Cirillo didn't do nearly as well in Colorado as most thought he would. In fact, his percentages in his first two (and only) seasons with the Rockies were virtually identical to his percentages in his last two seasons as a Brewer.
OBP Slug OPS
1998-1999 .401 .453 855
2000-2001 .379 .475 854
Cirillo's OBP dropped 22 points, and his slugging percentage rose 22 points. It's not supposed to work that way, though; you're supposed to post bigger numbers when you play half your games a mile high. The problem, as the note above suggests, is that Cirillo didn't do much on the road. Here are his road stats his last two years with Milwaukee and his two years with Colorado:
Road OBP Slug OPS 1998-1999 .388 .461 849 2000-2001 .311 .361 672 I have suggested, a number of times now, that while Coors Field is obviously a wonderful place to hit, it also seems to have a negative effect on the road performances of Rockies hitters. The thinking with a player like Cirillo used to go something like this: "Gosh, he was excellent on the road when he was a Brewer. So if we get him, he'll keep doing the same thing on the road, plus he'll get the Coors boost to his home stats. And then we'll really see some big numbers." But as we've seen, it didn't work out that way. Fortunately for the Mariners, history suggests that while Cirillo's home stats will drop when he leaves Colorado, his road stats will likely rebound, too. Probably not to their pre-1999 level -- after all, he is 32 -- but I do think that Cirillo will rank among the top four or five third basemen in the American League next season. Last week, after writing about the Angels and their continuing lack of scoring punch, I discovered that the franchise does indeed have some diehard fans. Here's one of them now ...
Sic. Fortunately, most of the e-mail I receive is a bit more, umm, constructive than this. Not all, but most. For example,
You wrote: "The Angels' best hope is a return to form by Tim Salmon, who, suffering from a shoulder injury, was basically a zero in right field last year after enjoying one of his best seasons in 2000. Still, even a comeback from Salmon won't be enough to lift the Angels into contention. Given the current composition of the roster, there's only one other position with a lot of room for improvement: first base, which was a disaster in 2001." You forgot about Darin Erstad having a horrible year. With Salmon and Erstad rebounding, taking the pressure off Garret Anderson and the young Troy Glaus to carry the whole load like last year, the offense will be better than last year. Also, as for first base, Erstad will most likely play first as he did prior to Mo coming to Anaheim. That leaves the Angels in need of an outfielder rather than a first baseman. Maybe free-agent Reggie Sanders or minor leaguer Jeff DaVanon will fit the bill. So what about this lineup?
SS Eckstein This is not a bad lineup. It is sure better than what your "worse case scenario column" suggests. We also don't have Mo clogging up the basepaths.
John Velick Agreed, the offense will be better than last year. But it doesn't have anything to do with Garret Anderson, who last year did exactly what he always does. As for Glaus, the only difference between his 2000 season and his 2001 season was about a dozen hits and five walks. In other words, nothing. If you're counting on big improvements from either of those guys, you're going to be disappointed. The most common comment I received from Angels fans was, "You forgot about Darin Erstad." And indeed, I did. But now that I've been reminded, I'm not sure what all the fuss is about. Yes, Erstad's numbers last season dropped precipitously from 2000, when he batted .355 and led the American League with 240 hits. But let's take his history back one more step ...
Runs RBI OBP Slug
1999 84 53 .308 .374
2000 121 100 .409 .541
2001 89 63 .331 .360
As they say on Sesame Street, which one of these is not like the others? Was Erstad's 2001 season the anomaly, or was it that brilliant 2000 season? Actually, both are somewhat anomalous. I think Erstad will settle in at a level somewhere close to his career numbers: .352 OBP, .441 slugging. And while that will certainly contribute to an improvement for the Angels in the runs column, they're not going to leap from 12th in the league to sixth or seventh, which is the minimum improvement they'd need for a shot at the postseason. As for DaVanon and Wooten, they're both solid complementary players, but they're also both in their late 20s and have virtually no star potential. If the Angels are going to contend, they need another BAT, and I simply don't see them acquiring another BAT between now and Opening Day.
Check out this quote from Rangers owner Tom Hicks: "We're not the New York Yankees. We can't just dial up and order up the best players," Hicks said. "So he's taken some risks, some personal risks, but I think there's great upside to the moves he's made." Does this guy forget that he paid A-Rod more than a quarter of a BILLION dollars? The Rangers had no pitching last year, now they added the one of the top free-agent pitchers in Chan Ho Park (at $65 million over five years). Mr. Hicks seems to be at no loss for pocket change. But I will agree with him, the Rangers are not the Yankees, they do not win. Mike Ain't owners great? When they spend a lot of money, it's simply good business. When somebody else does it, it's a "personal risk." Well, if you want to talk about risks, what about risks, what about Chan Ho Park? His road ERA over the last five seasons was 4.66, which isn't exactly what Hicks had in mind when he committed that $65 million over five seasons. True, in a couple of years the Rangers are going to have the best lineup in the West. But though Park will become the Rangers' ace by default, Hicks' team is still a quality starter or two away from contending for anything more than third place. I also have an editorial comment here, which is that writers -- and they do this all the time -- shouldn't substitute "quarter of a BILLION dollars" for "$250 million." It's a rhetorical trick, and a misleading one at that. The trick, of course, is to inject "billion" into the discussion, because that's an impressive word. But it really doesn't have anything to do with the discussion, because a quarter of a billion isn't anything like a billion, any more than a quarter is like a dollar.
FRIDAY, DEC. 28 A year ago, the Angels finished with the fifth-best ERA in the American League, and they've got a great chance to get better in 2002. First they signed Aaron Sele, and now they've traded for Kevin Appier, so here's how the 2002 rotation shapes up:
Pitcher 2001 ERA Career ERA Aaron Sele 3.60 4.33 Kevin Appier 3.57 3.63 Ja. Washburn 3.77 4.14 Ramon Ortiz 4.36 4.86 Sc. Schoeneweis 5.08 5.27 Last season the American League ERA was 4.47, which means that at this moment, four of five projected Angel starters were better than league average in 2001. And there aren't many teams that can claim the same. Just as important, Sele and Appier push Pat Rapp (5-12, 4.76) and Ismael Valdes (9-13, 4.45) out of the rotation, which leaves only Schoeneweis to serve as an Innings Eater. Of course, notwithstanding what Dave Anderson might tell you, there's more to winning than pitching. Last season the Angels ranked 12th in the American League in runs scored, and were closer to ranking 14th (and last) than 11th. So what have the Angels done to improve the lineup? Well, let's see ... they re-signed Benji Gil, they re-signed Jorge Fabregas ... wait a second, I said “improve,” didn't I? The truth is that Angels GM Bill Stoneman hasn't done a single thing, to this point at least, to bolster the club's run production. The Angels' best hope is a return to form by Tim Salmon, who, suffering from a shoulder injury, was basically a zero in right field last year after enjoying one of his best seasons in 2000. Still, even a comeback from Salmon won't be enough to lift the Angels into contention. Given the current composition of the roster, there's only one other position with a lot of room for improvement: first base, which was a disaster in 2001. Scott Spiezio's a handy guy to have around, but when he plays more than 100 games at first base -- 105, to be precise -- you've got yourself in a whole heap of trouble. So the Angels desperately need a first baseman, and their best hope there was an old hope: Mo Vaughn. Yes, Mo Vaughn is fat. Yes, Mo Vaughn is overpaid. Yes, Mo Vaughn is apparently injury-prone. And yes, if Mo Vaughn were still an Angel, Kevin Appier would not be an Angel. On balance, the Angels might be better off without Vaughn, who obviously didn't want to spend one more day in Orange County. But without him, they simply won't score enough runs to compete, because they don't have anybody in the minors who can help, and, they're not going to spend the money on a Proven Veteran, and they're not smart enough to sign somebody like Roberto Petagine. Sele and Appier both will still be under contract in 2004, which is about the earliest the Angels might be expected to challenge the Mariners and Athletics. Of course, in 2004 Aaron Sele will be 34, and Kevin Appier will be 36 .... The Mets, on the other hand, probably have to be considered the favorites in the National League East, Mo Vaughn's warts and all. One writer suggested that the Mets are going to be 2002's version of the 2001 Rangers, which is clever but not quite accurate. The 2001 Rangers didn't have any pitching, but the 2002 Mets will still have pretty good pitching, even without Appier. The 2001 Rangers spent millions on has-beens like Ken Caminiti and Andres Galarraga and Chad Curtis, but the Mets are spending their millions on productive players like Roberto Alomar and Mo Vaughn and Roger Cedeno. I don't mean to suggest that the Mets are going to win 100 games, or that some of their money won't be ill-spent. But the Mets look to me like the best team in the East, and that's even without Juan Gonzalez.
WEDNESDAY, DEC. 26 Here's what the Yankees have done in the last six seasons:
Runs (Rk) Walks (Rk) OBP (Rk)
1996 871 (8) 632 (8) .360 (4)
1997 891 (2) 676 (1) .362 (1)
1998 965 (1) 653 (1) .364 (1)
1999 900 (3) 718 (3) .366 (2)
2000 871 (6) 631 (4) .354 (5)
2001 804 (5) 519 (7) .334 (8)
I should point out that the Yankees' .334 OBP this season isn't as bad as it looks. One, the American League OBP in 2001 was down 15 points from 2000 (from .349 to .334). And two, if they'd drawn just four more walks, the Yanks would have ranked sixth in OBP rather than eighth, and fifth in walks rather than seventh. Still, it's clear that the Yankee offense was in decline, and it's clear that the problem was an aging lineup. The Bronxians were Bombers in 1997 and '98, but as the players have gotten older, the team OBP has declined, and the Yankees have scored fewer runs relative to the league. So Cashman set about to get younger and better, and that's exactly what he did. The table below lists 2001 numbers for the players at four positions last year, and numbers for the players who will take over at those same four positions this year.
Old New
Age OBP Age OBP
1B 33 .329 30 .477
3B 34 .343 34 .359
LF 32 .339 30 .371
RF 38 .330 35 .364
I didn't include the DH slot, where Nick Johnson takes over for David Justice, because Johnson doesn't really have an "old" OBP; we do know, though, that Johnson is more than a dozen years younger than Justice. At the other four spots, the new players all had better OBP's in 2001 than the men they replace, and everywhere except third base they're younger, too. Granted, the Yankees still aren't anything like young -- all of the recent acquisitions will be on the wrong side of 30 next season -- but they're certainly younger than they were a year ago. So the Yankees will score more runs in 2002 than they scored in 2001, which is a testament to both Cashman (and his colleagues) and George Steinbrenner's oh-so-deep prospects. Which reminds me, more than a few Yankee fans got upset over something I said in a chat a few weeks ago, something that's been plastered across the bottom of our baseball page since then ...
"Of course (the Yankees are) buying a title. Or at least attempting to buy a title. As long as the Yankees were winning World Series, they actually kept their payroll in the same neighborhood with the other rich clubs (Red Sox, Dodgers). But now that they lost a World Series, it's apparently time to forget about any sort of restraint." I'm not sure why anyone would be offended by that. Yes, I know that the money won't buy a championship unless there's some wisdom behind it. But it's one thing to know you need to improve your lineup, and it's quite another to have the financial freedom to both sign Jason Giambi and Rondell White, and keep Derek Jeter and Bernie Williams and Jorge Posada. Those five players alone will earn approximately $62 million in 2002 (considering the average annual values of their contracts), which is more than a dozen major-league teams spent on their entire rosters in 2001. Look, there have always been teams that drew on greater financial resources than others. And for much of baseball history, that team has been the New York Yankees. One can argue whether or not that's "fair," but it's silly to argue whether or not the Yankees have, and have had, a significant financial advantage. Because it's clear that they have.
THURSDAY, DEC. 20 Save the Twins, but kill the Royals. Let's be honest here, folks. Milwaukee may be the worst market in the major leagues (Montreal notwithstanding), but the Brewers have a new ballpark so they're not going anywhere. And if you're looking for a franchise that's facing all sorts of problems, just look at Kansas City. The Royals have virtually no chance of generating significant revenues via their ballpark or their local broadcast rights, either now or in the future. It's a matter of public record that I'm not a fan of "contraction" (which is a pretty word for "extermination"). The Twins just need to get healthy, and the Expos probably need to be moved. But if the owners are dead-set on killing a couple of franchises, take my Royals. Please. Because if I'm forced to watch Allard Baird run the franchise for another year or three, I'm going to have a lot of tension inside me, and writing columns like this one isn't nearly as therapeutic as it used to be. I just might have to start watching football games again, or shoot small animals on weekends. What am I talking about? Just this week, in the space of 48 hours, the (supposedly) cash-strapped (but profitable) Royals committed more than $4 million to a pair of players, Chuck Knoblauch and Michael Tucker, who don't have any business playing for a team that's only hope is its young players. In acquiring Knoblauch, Baird referred to the ex-Yankee as an "experienced leadoff hitter." True enough. But would you like to guess how many players scored more runs in 2001 than "experienced leadoff hitter" Chuck Knoblauch? 65 That's right. Leading off for a team that won 95 games, Chuck Knoblauch scored 66 runs, which coincidentally made him No. 66 in runs scored ... and that's just in the American League. The list of American Leaguers who scored more runs in fewer games than Knoblauch includes superstars like Cristian Guzman, Roger Cedeno, Kenny Lofton, Frank Catalanotto, Gabe Kapler, Damion Easley, Chris Richard, Jose Valentin and Tony Clark. Chuck Knoblauch isn't a bad player. He can still run, and he'll take a walk (which certainly sets him apart from his new teammates). But he's not good enough to play every day in left field, especially given how poorly he actually plays in left field. A good team and a smart manager would figure out a way to use Chuck Knoblauch; in the lineup against left-handed pitchers, the occasional start against particular right-handers, pinch-hitting when a baserunner is needed. Knoblauch's batting average will go up in 2002, but his OBP won't change much because Tony Muser doesn't like hitters who won't swing the bat. It's unmanly. The Royals are a bad team with a bad manager who thinks that stolen bases are more important than home runs and walks, so signing Chuck Knoblauch to a contract is roughly equivalent to dropping $2 million (plus incentives) into a wood chipper. And then there's Michael Tucker, who is, if for no other reason, qualified to play for the Royals because he has played for them before. Tucker is due to make $2.25 million in 2002, which means that he and Knoblauch will account for $4.25 million, and that's assuming that Knoblauch doesn't reach any of his incentives. And then, at some point next season, the Royals will trade Mike Sweeney and/or Carlos Beltran, because they can't "afford" to pay them. The other day, Allard Baird said, "In this market, we have a lot of young players who are on the verge of turning the corner. That's a very delicate developmental time ... Getting someone like this is very important. Getting a winner, a guy who's been there." There are a couple of problems with that argument. Baird and his predecessor have been saying that for years, using this "logic" to justify the acquisition of players like Jeff King, Hal Morris, Terry Pendleton, Chad Kreuter, and most recently, Roberto Hernandez. And yes, Mike Sweeney and Johnny Damon and Jermaine Dye and Carlos Beltran all matured into fine players with the Royals. But they became fine players because they got to play. Unfortunately, both Knoblauch and Tucker play the same positions that the Royals' best young players play. Dee Brown and Mark Quinn have both been huge disappointments, but both showed great talent in the minor leagues, and it's not too late for them to become solid major leaguers. Now, however, they're not going to get much of a chance to become anything, at least not in Kansas City. Because if Chuck Knoblauch is in the lineup every day (as planned) and Michael Tucker is in the lineup some days, then Brown and Quinn won't be. And that's not how you build a franchise. So again, Commissioner Bud, if you're reading this, please, if you're in the holiday spirit at all, put me out of my misery. Kill my favorite team.
WEDNESDAY, DEC. 19
There was a time, not so long ago, when the Indians made a practice of signing young players to long-term deals. In a span of just a few years in the early- and mid-1990s, the Indians signed Carlos Baerga, Albert Belle, Kenny Lofton, Manny Ramirez and Jim Thome to multi-year deals well before those players reached free agency. Those moves not only locked up great hitters, but also happened to save the franchise a lot of money. Well, the talent pipeline has dried up since then, with Richie Sexson and Sean Casey the only notable hitters produced by Cleveland's farm system in the last few years. And of course, both of them were traded away. But Indians GM Mark Shapiro still has positions to fill, and it's hard to entice established major leaguers without dangling long-term contracts. So he's given out the long-term deals (four years to Matt Lawton and three years to Ricky Gutierrez), but this time the recipients weren't young players on the cusp of productive careers, but instead they were old players on the cusp of career decline. Statistically, the most similar (recent) players to Lawton were Kevin Bass, Roberto Kelly, Ivan Calderon, Jeffrey Leonard, and Mike Davis. Let's look at what those five did in the four seasons leading up to their Age 29 seasons, and then in the four seasons after their Age 29 seasons: Bass Games OPS 26-29 621 774 30-33 361 725 Bass was, like Lawton, a solid right fielder who played in an All-Star Game when he was in his late 20s. Bass played well in his Age 30 season, but missed much of the year with a broken tibia. After that he was a part-time player and didn't compile more than 402 at-bats in a single season. Kelly Games OPS 26-29 466 764 30-33 414 788 Kelly remained productive in his early 30s, but didn't play as often. After a poor 1995 season (at 30) in which he played 136 games but posted a career-low OPS, Kelly became a part-time player, albeit a productive one. Calderon Games OPS 26-29 522 780 30-33 130 636 Ivan Calderon's career fell apart after he turned 30. Due to a series of injuries, by the time he turned 32, Calderon was out of the majors for good. Leonard Games OPS 26-29 488 761 30-33 508 711 Jeffrey Leonard had a couple of big years when he was 29 and 30, but never played particularly well again. Davis Games OPS 26-29 543 758 30-33 67 699 Davis's last hurrah was a crucial walk in Game 1 of the 1988 World Series; the next season he played 67 games, and that's the last we saw of him. Looking up at those numbers, does anyone else notice any sort of trend? Three of the five played significantly fewer games in the second four-year span, in large part because they simply weren't good enough to hold regular jobs. Four of the five saw their OPS decline, the exception being Roberto Kelly, who improved slightly (albeit with less playing time). OK, so it's only five players ... but you know what? I ran the same numbers for the five most similar players to Lawton before 1980, and I found exactly the same thing. I won't belabor the point, but the five players were Larry Hisle, Jackie Brandt, Willard Marshall, Bob Skinner, and Jim Russell, and three of them declined significantly after turning 30 (the exceptions were Marshall, who did decline but not significantly, and Skinner, whose percentages actually improved slightly). All five played significantly fewer games in the second four-year period. (If you're interested in Similarity Scores, check out Matt Lawton's entry at Baseball-Reference.com.) None of this should come as much of a surprise. Nearly 20 years ago, Bill James studied the subject and concluded, "The peak period for ballplayers is not twenty-eight to thirty-two, as was once believed, but twenty-five to twenty-nine." And after that? As a group, baseball players decline after they turn 30. That's not a problem if you're paying Barry Bonds or Jason Giambi, because when a superstar declines, he's still comfortably above replacement level, and will at least hold his job. But if you're talking about Matt Lawton ... well, if history is any guide, there's a pretty good chance that by the third or fourth year of his new deal, Lawton will be fighting just to stay in the lineup. Granted, there's a lot of talk that perhaps today's players are peaking later than they used to, that perhaps modern medicine and conditioning allows players to remain productive longer than they did in the past. To this point, however, that's all it is: talk. Smart people are doing sabermetric studies every day, and as far as I know, no one has yet proved that historical aging patterns are any different today than they were 10 or 20 years ago. And until someone does, there's not much evidence to suggest that signing 30-year-old players like Matt Lawton to long-term contracts is an effective use of financial resources. Then there's Gutierrez, who at 31 is even older than Lawton. There aren't many truly similar players to Gutierrez at the same age, but the most-similar are Kurt Stillwell, Mike Bordick, Jose Vizcaino, Craig Reynolds and Pat Meares. One problem with that group, however, is that each member was a shortstop, and Gutierrez will presumably be shifting to second base, which of course makes his bat less valuable. Bottom line, the Indians would have spent less money in 2002 if they'd actually kept Roberto Alomar. True, Alomar would likely have left as a free agent after the 2003 season, leaving the Indians without him or the players the Mets sent to Cleveland. But what have they really gained? For one season, I'd rather have Alomar than Lawton + Gutierrez. And down the road two seasons or three, it's unlikely that Lawton or Gutierrez will be championship-caliber players. At this moment, Cleveland's starting outfield consists of Brady Anderson, Milton Bradley and Matt Lawton. At this moment, the Indians are down to one great hitter: Jim Thome. At this moment, the Chicago White Sox think they've got a great chance to assume primacy in the American League Central. And at this moment, they're exactly right. |
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